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Toward a Social Theory of Law: An Essay
on the Study of Law and Development*
David M. Trubekt
Law is a practical science. It does not ordinarily dwell on funda-
mental questions about the social, political, and economic functions
of the legal order. Satisfied with implicit working assumptions about
these matters, legal thought moves rapidly to more tractable questions.
But when law's solutions to social problems fail to satisfy, it becomes
necessary to examine the basic theory from which they derive.' This
is such an era. In a time when men speak casually of a crisis of law,
and ask "is law dead?" 2 it is clear that law's role in society has become
problematic. Such an age demands a social theory of law.
It is now necessary to frame explicit and concise questions on the
relationship between law and social life, and to answer these questions
by disciplined inquiry. Since the implicit, a priori conclusions about
the role of law are no longer valid, we must turn to systematic efforts
to understand the relationships among the legal, social, economic, and
political orders. In any such effort, comparative research and cross-
cultural generalization will play a major role. This essay examines one
area in which such research has begun, the field of "law and develop-
* I wish to thank Jan Deutsch, Lawrence Friedman, Duncan Kennedy, Bolivar La-
mounier, Leon Lipson, Robert Seidman, and Henry Steiner for their valuable assistance
in the preparation of this article. I must acknowledge a special debt to Roberto Mangabeira
Unger. In addition to his advice on this essay, his extraordinary unpublished stud) "The
Place of Law in 'Modem' Society" (undated, on file in Yale Law Library) clarified ideas
that had been merely vague musings. Yet I, not my colleagues, must assume responsibility
for any errors or ambiguities in what follows. I first addressed these issues in an essay
published in Portuguese as Part I of a volume of studies on the Brazilian capital market:
D. TRUBEK, J. GOUVEA VIFURA & P. SA, 0 MERCADO DE CAPITALS E Os LiCE.%rivos Fs.scAts
23-92 (1971). As the reader will note, I have modified a number of the views set forth
in that piece.
This study was supported in part by a grant from the Agency for International De-
velopment to the Yale Law School's Program in Law and Modernization. The informa-
tion and conclusions in this study do not necessarily reflect the position of A.ID. or
the United States Government. Finally, I wish to thank Robert Peck for helping me
with the research.
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1. Cf. T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE or ScLENrIFIzc REvOLUTIONS (1962).
2. For a discussion of recent literature on these themes see, e.g., Mazor, The Crisis
of Liberal Legalism 81 YALE L.J. 1032 (1972).
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ment"; there, lawyers and some social scientists have attempted to
understand the function of law in the Third World-those nations
which have not yet achieved, but generally aspire to, self-sustaining
economic growth. Despite its commitment to comparative analysis
and the formulation of universal principles, however, this research on
law and development has not fulfilled its promise; it has produced
few original conceptions or insights, and seems incapable of formu-
lating a satisfactory research program.
While the field has reached something of an impasse, this was not
an inevitable result. Rather, it stems from the easy acceptance of cer-
tain underlying assumptions which have hampered fruitful inquiry.,
This essay attempts to analyze these assumptions and their effects,
and it suggests that their baneful influence can be avoided if more
promising intellectual perspectives are adopted. In so doing, the
essay is concerned primarily with clarifying those questions which
should be asked, and suggesting methods by which they can be
answered. Its primary goals, therefore, are to develop a few concepts
and correct some major errors, in order to clear the decks for further
inquiry.
As the argument is somewhat complex, I shall briefly summarize
its dominant themes. We begin with an attempt to identify the basic
features of contemporary thought on law and development, setting
forth a synthetic restatement of such thought, termed the "core con-
ception of modern law." The essay then argues that this conception
has misdirected the study of law and development by asserting 'that
one type of law-that found in the West-is essential for economic,
political, and social development in the Third World. This conclu-
sion, I contend, stems from the core conception's ethnocentric and
evolutionist generalization from Western history. The article con-
cludes by developing a preliminary typology which may permit more
discriminating study, and suggests its application to some recent de-
velopments in the legal life of a major Third World nation.
I. Contemporary "Law and Development" Thought:
The Core Conception
Modem social thought arose to explain the causes and impact of
industrialization, nationalism, and urbanization in the West.4 Con-
3. On the effect of fundamental assumptions in limiting fields of social inquiry, see
A. GOULDNER, THE COMING CRISIS OF WVETERN SOCIOLOGY 29-35 (1970).
4. See generally R. NISBEr, THE SOCIOLOGICAL TRADrIoN (1966).
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temporary studies of economic, political and social development carry
on this tradition in an effort to understand the Third World. But
since development research has not viewed law as a major aspect
of society,5 it has left the study of law and development primarily
to the lawyers. Perhaps because legal thought is generally pragmatic
and professional," writings on law are, when compared to other de-
velopment studies, relatively fragmentary and unsystematic. Many are
merely offshoots of "law reform" activities, not the result of organized
academic endeavors. Accordingly, a significant amount of law and
development "theory" is either implicit or unvritten.
This does not mean, however, that such theory is elusive or insig-
nificant. There are a fiercely held set of ideas and beliefs which under-
lie the major studies on law and development and the legal reform
projects carried out by lawyers from the United States and Europe.7
5. For example, development economists generally concede that development re-
quires some legal framework, which usually means a minimal provision of law and
order. Having said this, they usually drop the issue. See, e.g., H. BURTON, PRINCIPLES OF
DEvELOPMENT ECONOMICs 359-62 (1965); E. HAGEN, THE EcoNoMIics OF DEVELOPMET
480-84 (1968); S. KUZNETS, MODERN EcoNo ic GROWT 451-53 (1966); W.A. Lzwts, THE
THEORY OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 408-15 (1955).
Development economics normally deals only with two polar situations in analyzing
"law." Either a society is completely lacking in the "essential" legal institutions, or thom.e
institutions are present in sufficient "amounts" so that there is always "enough"
law to meet the current needs of the economy. In the former case, all that theory
can say is that "adequate legal institutions" should be created. In the latter, law is
simply defined away as a non-problem, and it is assumed that adequate supplies
of this factor will always emerge as needed. To paraphrase Sir Arthur Lewis, in the
typical economic development model, development proceeds with "unlimited supplies
of law." Lewis, Economic Development With Unlimited Supplies of Labour, 22 MAN-
MATrEN SCHOOL 13a (1954).
Contemporary economic development theorists seem to have forgotten or rejected
the 19th century belief in the importance of law. For example, when European colonial-
ists encountered the civilizations of Africa, Latin America, and Asia. the) frequently
concluded that these societies lacked the "rule of law," which, they held, was a cardinal
feature of the West. J. FURNIVALL, COLONIAL POLICY AND P.ACricE passim (1956); L.
PYE, ASPECTS OF POLITICAL DEv.LoPMraT 113-25 (1966). Much colonial "economic-develop.
ment" policy assumed that if the "rule of law" were instituted in traditional societies.
economic progress would follow. See L. PYE, supra at 114-16. Finally, no one has stressed
the importance of law in economic progress more than Jeremy Bentham, the founder of
utilitarianism, and thus the grandfather of modem economics. J. BENTiA.m, Principles of
the Civil Code, chs. II-V, XVII, in TroRY oF LEGISLATION 96-102. 148-57 (R. Hildreth
transl. 1871). See generally E. STOESs, THE ENGLIStH UTILrrARIANS AND INDIA (1959).
6. Two studies have appraised the resistance of law schools and the legal profession
to the introduction of social science techniques and theories. Riesman, Law and Sociology:
Recruitment, Training, and Colleagueship, in LAw AND SocIoLOGY: ExNpvony.4TO EssAYs
12, 24-40 (W.M. Evan ed. 1962); Stevens, Two Cheers for 1870: The American Law School,
in 5 PERSPECTIVES IN AMER. HISTORY 405, 470.548 (D. Fleming & B. Bai)n eds. 1971).
7. See, e.g., Rheinstein, Problems of Law in the New Nations of Africa, in OLD So-
CIETIES AND NEW STATES: THE QUEST FOR MODERNITY IN ASIA AND AFRICA 220 (C. Geertz
ed. 1963) [hereinafter cited as Rheinstein]; David, A Civil Code for Ethiopia: Considera-
tions on the Codification of the Civil Law in African Countries, 37 Tut- L. RE'V. 187
(1963) [hereinafter cited as David]; Allott, Legal Development and Economic Growth
in Africa, in CHANGING LAws IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES U.N.D. Anderson ed. 1963); Meril-
lat, Law and Developing Countries, 60 AM. J. Ir'L L. 71 (1966) (report of a July, 1965
conference) [hereinafter cited as Merillat]; Galanter, The Modernization of Law, in
MODERNIZATION: Tm DYNAMICS OF GROwTH 153 (M. Weiner ed. 1966) [hereinafter cited
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These ideas are not less influential for their unsystematic nature. But
it would be impossible to study or criticize them without a more com-
plete articulation of their teachings-a synthesis of their views here
called "the core conception of modern law.
' 8
A. The Nature of Modern Law
The core conception views modem law as a specific social process
emerging from the overall process of development. Modern law has
three principal characteristics: It is primarily a system of rules; it is
a form of purposive human action; and it is simultaneously part of,
yet autonomous from, the nation-state.9
All societies, if they are to endure, must contain some system or
as Galanter]; Karst, Law in Developing Countries, 60 L. LIBRARY J. 13 (1967) (licreln.
after cited as Karst]; Friedman, Legal Culture and Social Development, 4 L. & Soc'Y
REV. 29 (1969); Friedman, On Legal Development, 24 RUTrERS L. REV. 11 (1969) [herein.
after cited as Friedman]; Kbnz, Legal Development in Developing Countries, 1969 IVao-
CEEDINGS OF THE AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 91 [hereinafter cited as Kbnz]; Rosenn, The Reform
of Legal Education in Brazil, 21 J. LEGAL ED. 251 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Rosenn];
Mendelson, Law and the Development of Nations, 32 J. of POL. 223 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Mendelson]; Steinberg, Law, Development and Korean Society, 3 J. Co~sr. AD.
215 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Steinberg]; Steiner, Legal Education and Socio.Economic
Change: Brazilian Perspectives, 19 AM. J. Comv. L. 39 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Steiner];
D. TRUBEK, LAW, PLANNING, AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BRAZILIAN CAI'ITAL MARKEr
(Yale Law School Studies in Law and Modernization No. 3) [reprinted from BULL., Nos.
72 & 73 (N.Y. Univ. Grad. School of Business Admin., April, 1971)] [hereinafter cited as
Trubek]; D. TRUBEK, J. GouvEA VIEIRA & P. SA, 0 MERCADO DE CAPITALS E 05 INCENTIVOS
FiscAIs 23-92 (1971) [hereinafter cited as D. TRUEV, J. GouvEA VIEIRA, & P. SA], Kozol.
chyk, Toward a Theory of Law in Economic Development: The Costa Rican USAID-
ROCAP Project, 1971 L. & SOCIAL ORDER 681 [hereinafter cited as Kozolchyk]; Seldman,
Law and Development: A General Model, 6 L. & Soc'Y REV. 311 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as Seidman].
8. In constructing and documenting the core conception, I have relied on my own
research and experience, studies by others, and private discussions with my colleagues
in law and development. Although I may have omitted some of the subtleties of my
colleagues' work, my purpose in constructing the core conception is not to condemn
anyone (including myself), but rather to illuminate the dominant and implicit as.
sumptions which have misdirected the study of law and development.
The explication of the core conception is intended to show the need for a basic in-
tellectual shift in law and development study. Gouldner has noted that when the
background or domain assumptions of a social theory come to operate in new condi.
tions for which they are inapposite, an uncomfortable dissonance is created for the
theorist, and a basic intellectual shift impends. A. GOULDNER, supra note 3, at 34.
One can see such dissonance in Steiner. While his piece, supra note 7, articulates the
"core conception" for regulated market economies, it also includes a perceptive critique
of it. The article, as a result, appears at times inconsistent. This comes, I believe, from
Steiner's awareness that his ideas on law and development were not fully capable of
grasping what he perceived in Brazilian legal life. As a result, the piece manifests a
dissonance between the received ideas and perceived reality.
Growing awareness of the gap between conventional notions and Third World legal
phenomena has generated dissonance in writers like Steiner; at the same time critical
analysis of domain assumptions has heightened the dissatisfaction with core conception
ideas. A major critique has been articulated by Duncan Kennedy and Roberto Manga.
beira Unger; Unger's unpublished essay "The Place of Law in 'Modern' Society" (un-
dated, on file in the Yale Law Library) [hereinafter cited as Unger] sets forth this
critique systematically.
9. The most concise, systematic statement of the elements of "modern" law, one
which conforms exactly to this tripartite outline, is in Galanter, supra note 7, at 154.56.
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process which contains the egoistic tendencies of individuals and con-
trols the conflict of groups. The core conception believes that modern
societies achieve order primarily through law, that is, through a sys-
tem of rules. Since it posits that modern society cannot exist without
such rules, the core conception argues that modernization or develop-
ment necessarily entails the institutionalization of such social control.10
The nature of modern law can be seen most clearly when contrasted
with the processes of social ordering in traditional societies." There,
patterns of conduct are defined and maintained by primary social
groups, such as the village, lineage, or tribe. As a result, normative
prescription varies with geographic place and social situation: There
is a separate "law" for each village or tribe, and the "law" that binds
the lord is not the law that binds the serf or burgher. Modern law,
on the other hand, consists of general rules applied by specialized
agencies universally and uniformly through all regions and to all
social strata. Modern law is also relatively autonomous from other
sources of normative order. Thus, one unitary and superior social
entity-the modem legal system-replaces the village or tribe in social
control.
The concept of purposiveness is a third contrast between modem
law and traditional social ordering. It is assumed that the prescrip-
tions of traditional society are shaped from history and custom. Mod-
em law, by contrast, is conscious and rational; and since it has been
consciously constructed, modern law must necessarily have some self-
conscious purpose. But the core conception of purposiveness is broader
than that implied by mere conscious design. Modern law is also viewed
as an instrument through which a variety of possible social goals may
be achieved.12 Thus, it not only releases man from the grasp of tradi-
tional norms and values, it also gives him the means to shape the world
in which he lives. The core conception of legal purposiveness is, there-
fore, highly instrumental: It assumes that social life can be shaped by
some social will, for example a modernizing elite, which brings about
development through legal enactment and enforcement.
10. See Karst, supra note 7, at 16-19; Rosenn, supra note 7, at -53; Seidman, supra
note 7, at 311-16.
11. See Galanter, supra note 7, at 154-56; Rheinstein, supra note 7, at 225.28, 242-44;
Steinberg, supra note 7, at 223-27. See also David, supra note 7, at 194, 203.
12. Galanter stresses that "the system is rational .... Rules are valued for their in-
strumental utility in producing consciously chosen ends . G..." alanter. supra note 7, at
155. Friedman observes that legal systems become "modern" only when men perceive
law to be an instrument employed "to advance in a rational way toward some know-
able goal." Friedman, supra note 7, at 30. See also David, supra note 7, at 194, 203.04;
Kozolchyk, supra note 7, at 746, 751; Merillat, supra note 7, at 73; Seidman, supra note
7, passim; Steinberg, supra note 7, at 216; Trubek, supra note 7, at 10.
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Purposiveness and rules, though necessary, are not sufficient con-
ditions for a viable system of modern law: Such law can affect social
order only if it also has behind it the organized force of the state. The
core conception believes that without a strong, relatively centralized
state, the rules of law will not shape and determine social life.13 They
will be mere paper artifacts, incapable of restraining conflict or bring-
ing about purposive goals. Just as law needs a strong state to be "effec-
tive," so the existence of law enhances the state's power. The state
creates the system of rules and the courts and other institutions which
make, apply, and enforce the law; the rise of modern law supplants
local, "particularistic," and traditional forces, and is thus the vehicle
through which the state replaces communal or traditional authority.
As national law grants men rights and immunities, they escape from
the hold of village and tribe.14 Similarly, modern law's rationality
and universality strengthens the state: By professing to be the mani-
festation of reason, and treating all men as equals, modern law legiti-
mates the state, and thus enhances its ability to impose specific substan-
tive norms, rules, or purposes.1 5
B. The Relationship Between Modern Law and
Economic Development
Like a power grid or transportation network, modern law is viewed
in the core conception as a functional prerequisite of an industrial
economy. 16 While all modern law thinkers share this view, few articu-
late the relationship between law and economic growth with real clar-
ity. To the extent that such articulation occurs, one can identify dif-
ferent and potentially conflicting tendencies within the core con-
ception.
One explanation stresses the role of law in market economies. This
perspective assumes that market institutions are necessary for eco-
nomic growth, and sees modern law as essential to the creation and
13. See p. 7 infra.
14. Cohn, Some Notes on Law and Change in North India, in LAW & WARFARE 139,
155-59 (P. Bohannan ed. 1967); Friedman, supra note 7, at 47-48; Galanter, supra note
7, at 162; Rheinstein, supra note 7, at 225, 235. See also David, supra note 7, at 202.
15. C. BLACK, THE DYNAMICS OF MODERNIZATION 14-15 (1966); Braibanti, The Role of
Law In Political Development, in INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW OF TIlE COM-
MONwEALTH 3 (Wilson ed. 1968); Konz, supra note 7, at 91; Mendelson, supra note 7,
at 224, 229-32; Rheinstein, supra note 7, at 225; Seidman, supra note 7, at 328.30; Steln-
berg, supra note 7, at 217-18. See also Friedman, supra note 7, at 48.49, 52-53.
16. David, supra note 7, at 188-89; K6nz, supra note 7, at 98; Mendelson, supra note
7, at 232; Merillat, supra note 7, at 74; Parsons, Evolutionary Universals in Society, 29
AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 339, 350-53 (1964); Rheinstein, supra note 7, at 226; Rosenn, supra
note 7, at 253.
Vol. 82: 1, 1972
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maintenance of markets.' 7 The emphasis here is on modern law's pre-
dictability as a set of universal rules uniformly applied. As a result
of such predictability, modern law encourages men to engage in new
forms of economic activity and guarantees that the fruits of this activ-
ity will be protected. Law thus frees the individual from "the pre-
scriptive usage of the particularistic group"18 and assures the individ-
ual that his decisions will be enforced by state authority, his acquisi-
tions protected from the depredations of others.1 Through institu-
tions such as contract and private property rights, modem law pro-
motes the development of markets and hence economic growth.
The second, and perhaps conflicting, explanation of the relation-
ship between law and growth stresses law's purposiveness and power.
In this perspective, development is viewed as a consciously willed
transformation of economic activity. The state is seen as the chief
vehicle through which this conscious design is articulated and imposed
upon the population; modern law is the instrument through which
such development goals are translated into specific, enforceable
norms.2 0 The more effectively these norms define and channel be-
havior, the more likely economic growth will occur.
Because the core conception holds this view of law, it is concerned
with maximizing the "effectiveness" and social "penetration" of mod-
em rules. Penetration and effectiveness are the measure of the state's
capacity to exert its power. And legal development is often equated
with an increase in the state's power to use law for the realization of
its economic goals.
21
Consequently, some writers argue that research on law and economic
development should be directed toward questions which identify those
variables in legal culture and organization which increase legal "effec-
tiveness."'22 For some these questions have been answered: 'What is
17. Karst, supra note 7, at 15; Kozolchyk, supra note 7, at 737, 739, 741-42; Mendel-
son, supra note 7, at 226-27, 230-31, 232; Rheinstein, supra note 7, at 229-30, 232, 238-
40, 243; Steiner, supra note 7, at 47-48; Trubek, supra note 7, at 10.
18. Galanter, supra note 7, at 162. See also note 14 supra.
19. David, supra note 7, at 188-89; Karst, supra note 7. at 13-16; Rheinstein, supra
note 7, at 232; Trubek, supra note 7, at 54-55. See also Mendelson, supra note 7. at 226-
27, 230-32.
20. David, supra note 7, at 203-04; Friedman, supra note 7, at 30; Kozolch)k, supra note
7, at 746; Rheinstein, supra note 7, at 221; Seidman, supra note 7. passim; Steinberg.
supra note 7, at 232-33, 245; Trubek, supra note 7, at 10.
21. See Friedman, supra note 7, at 30; K6nz, supra note 7, at 94-95; cf. Kozolchyk,
supra note 7, at 738, 74041; Trubek, supra note 7, at 54-55. Elsewhere, Friedman also
stresses the importance of "penetration" and "effectiveness." He notes that both may be
linked as much to "participation" as to increased power. Friedman, Legal Culture and
Social Development, 4 L. & Soc'Y REv. 29, 44 (1969).
22. Friedman, supra note 7, at 58-61; K~nz, supra note 7, at 95-96; Kozolch)k, supra
note 7, at 744-45; Seidman, supra note 7, passim. See also Rheinstein, supra note 7,
passim; Trubek, supra note 7, at 54-56.
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needed is an increase in the instrumental capability of the legal sys-
tem. The more law becomes a mechanism or an instrument to ad-
vance rationally toward specified goals, the more effective it will be-
come. This will be achieved, it is argued, only if the legal culture
embraces an instrumental conception of law which fosters the clarifi-
cation of economic goals and their relationship to the legal system.
28
For those who accept this belief, the problem of legal development
is solved: One must merely discover which local changes lead to greater
instrumentalism. 24 But as we shall see, this may at times and in cer-
tain places prove to be a dangerous formula.
C. The Relationship Between Modern Law and
Political Development
Modem law is also viewed as an essential element in political de-
velopment. In the core conception, such development means not only
the creation of a strong, central state, but also the construction of a
pluralist, liberal-democratic government.25 Thus, the core conception
also sees law as the primary restraint on arbitrary state action. Care
is taken to distinguish law from power: One writer equates law with
"principled adjudication"; 2 others find it essential to political devel-
opment because it eliminates arbitrary exercises of state power.27 In
this sense, law is not merely a technique of state control to be applied
for any purpose; rather, it is seen as necessarily committed to specific
values, such as even-handedness and fairness.28 Some writers even
identify law with the liberal society and democracy; for them, develop-
ment of modem law necessarily means the attainment of such liberal
goals as wider participation in the formation of social norms and the
guarantee of specific individual rights .
2
23. Kozolchyk, supra note 7, at 751; Merillat, supra note 7, at 73; Rheinstein, supra
note 7, at 227-28, 235; Seidman, supra note 7, passim; Trubek, supra note 7, at 9.10, 24-28,
52-53.
24. Freidman, supra note 7, passim; Kozolchyk, supra note 7, at 736, 741-42; Rheln-
stein, supra note 7, at 244; Rosenn, supra note 7, at 251-55; Seidman, supra note 7, at
331-32.
25. Karst, supra note 7, at 16-19; Steinberg, supra note 7, at 246-47; Trubek, supra
note 7, at 9, 53 Konz notes that the adoption of foreign legal models "has introduced
democratic concepts which are as valid in Africa and Asia as they are in Western
countries." K6nz, supra note 7, at 95.
26. Karst, supra note 7, at 18.
27. See, e.g., A. RIVKIN, NATION-BUILDING IN AFRICA; PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTs 112-30
(1969); Braibanti, Public Bureaucracy and Judiciary in Pakistan, in BUREAUCRACY AND
POLITICAL DEVFLOPMENT 360-440 (J. LaPalombara ed. 1963); Karst, supra note 7, at 18-19;
Steinberg, supra note 7, at 230-31, 237, 247-49.
28. Kozolchyk, supra note 7, at 741-42; Steiner, supra note 7, at 48-50, 58.
29. Friedman, supra note 7, at 30; Karst, supra note 7, at 16-19; Kozolchyk, supra note
7, at 746; Rheinstein, supra note 7, at 245-46; Steinberg, supra note 7, at 236-37, 246.48;
Trubek, supra note 7, at 9, 53.
Vol. 82: 1, 1972
HeinOnline  -- 82 Yale L.J. 8 1972-1973
Toward a Social Theory of Law
It is apparent that if "law" or "the legal system" is to constrain the
state, it must be in some way autonomous.30 For this reason, the core
conception assumes-often implicitly-that an independent judiciary,
techniques to curb administrative discretion, constitutionalism, and
even judicial review are necessary elements in the development of
modem law.31
D. The Program of Legal Development
There is considerable consensus on the program of "legal develop-
ment" that follows from the core conception. Since modem law is a
process by which rules governing social life are consciously formu-
lated and consistently applied, the basic goal is to ensure that social
life is effectively governed by universal and purposive rules. As the
core conception views reality, this goal entails many changes in the
legal system of Third World nations. First, law already on the books
must be perfected. "Modem" substantive rules, such as those guar-
anteeing freedom of contract and protecting political association must
be adopted,3 2 if necessary, by importing foreign codes.33 These rules
must be truly universal; residual particularisms must be suppressed;
customary and special law must yield to "rationally" enacted modern
law.34 Rules on paper must become rules in fact; impartial application
must become a reality.3 5 Legislators in more or less representative bod-
ies must learn to formulate rules that are impartial, yet simultaneously
achieve priority developmental goals. Lawyers must learn to argue
and judges to reason in terms of these rules and the goals which under-
lie them.
The centrality of legal purposiveness in the core conception's legal
development prog-ram emphasizes the importance of legal education
reform.3 6 The core conception finds that the legal systems of the Third
30. A. RivKIN, supra note 27, at 112-30; Galanter, supra note 7,' at 156; Karst, supra
note 7, at 18-19; Steinberg, supra note 7, at 247-49.
31. See generally pp. 8-9 supra and notes.
32. A. RIvKxN, supra note 27, at 112-30; Karst, supra note 7, at 18-19; Kozolch)k, stra
note 7, at 739; Mendelson, supra note 7, at 227-31; Rheinstein, supra note 7, at 226, 32,
236-38 (emancipation of women), 240 (law of inheritance); Steinberg, supra note 7, at 246-
48; Trubek, supra note 7, at 54-55.
33. David, supra note 7, passim; K6nz, supra note 7, at 95.
34. David, supra note 7, at 194, 203; Friedman, supra note 7, at 52-53; Galanter, supra
note 7, at 158-61; Rheinstein, supra note 7, at 226-28, 235; Steinberg, supra note 7, at
219-20.
35. Friedman, supra note 21, at 29, 43; Trubek, supra note 7, at 54.
36. J. MURPHY, LEGAL EDUCATION IN A DEVELOPING NATION: TIlE Koy-A EXPEXUENCE 54-
60 (Korea Law Study Series No. 1, 1967); Allott, supra note 7, at 207; Karst, supra note 7,
at 19-20; K6nz, supra note 7, at 99-100; Kozolchyk, supra note 7, at 751-55; Merillat, supra
note 7, at 76; Rosenn, supra note 7, passim; Steinberg, supra note 7, at 222, 232-33;
Steiner, supra note 7, passim; Trubek supra note 7, at 53; von Mehren, Law and Legal
Education in India: Some Observations, 78 H-Rv. L. REv. 1180 (1965).
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World are formalistic and traditional.3 7 Lawyers who work in such
traditions, it is argued, see law as a body of relatively sacred and im-
mutable principles which are applied to social life through highly
formal or ritualistic techniques. The core conception argues that legal
development must begin by forcing Third World lawyers to redefine
their concepts of law and its social function; once this is accomplished,
the correct program of legal development will hopefully become ap-
parent. Thus legal education reform is the wedge leading to reform
of the entire legal system. And, given the basic assumptions about the
economic and political functions of modern law,3 8 the core conception
promises that this education-spurred reform will stimulate economic
development and political democracy.39
II. An Appraisal of the Core Conception
A. Introduction
The core conception is able to prescribe positive programs for the
legal development of the Third World because it believes it has dis-
covered a key to understanding the relationship between law and de-
velopment. Since economic and political development are thought to
require "modern law," efforts to create a modern legal system will
necessarily foster development.
There are two elements to this credo. First, there is the implicit
concept of development which equates it with gradual evolution in the
direction of the advanced, industrial nations of the West.40 Second,
given its definition of development, the core conception quite pre-
dictably equates modern law with the legal structures and cultures
of the West.41 The Third World is thus assumed to be doomed to
37. E.g., Kozolchyk, supra note 7, at 746; Mferillat, supra note 7, at 73; Rosenn, supra
note 7, at 254-57; Steinberg, supra note 7, at 240, 244-45, 249; Steiner, supra note 7, at
52-55; von Mehren, supra note 36, at 1181-82, 1186-87.
38. See pp. 6-9 supra.
39. See, e.g., Rosenn, supra note 7, at 283; Steiner, supra note 7, at 70-82. But Steiner
hedges considerably on the promise. Steiner, supra note 7, at 86-90.
40. This approach is apparent in Mendelson's statement of a universalistic, three-stage
model of development which sees every nation evolving from primitive 
unification to in.
dustrialism to welfare statism. Mendelson, supra note 7, at 223. A similar monistic theory
permeates the literature: Men abandon the traditional social order, and regroup Into
centralized nation states. See pp. 5-6 and notes 11, 14, 15 supra. Economic growth is
viewed as based exclusively on the market system, p. 7 and note 17 supra. See C. BLAcK,
supra note 15, for an excursion along the path of modernization-and Westernization-
in five areas of human existence.
41. The concepts of pluralism, and individual rights against the state, legal autonomy,
and the rule of law are Western in origin. Pp. 8-9 and notes 25-31 supra. Thus, devia-
tions from Western traditions are viewed skeptically at best: Galanter sees indigenous
legal revivalist movements doomed to failure, supra note 7, at 163. Steinberg worries about
the encroachment of Japanese legal concepts in Korea, supra note 7, at 250-52, and K13nz
about the institution of informal conciliation boards in Ceylon, supra note 7, at 97.98.
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underdevelopment until it adopts a modern Western legal system.
Because these beliefs are held to be self-evident, the core conception
is not timid about prescribing desired legal reform for nations with
a diversity of legal and cultural traditions, economic organizations, or
political structures. For example, Western European observers will
prescribe rigorous codification of civil law for nations as disparate as
Ethiopia42 and Turkey,43 while Americans will prescribe a more in-
strumental form of legal education as the true path to development
in Brazil,44 Korea,45 and India.40
Moreover, since the relationships between law and development are
thought to be invariable, the core conception is more concerned with
the exportation of Western systems than with efforts to understand
the legal life of the Third World. Having answered in cursory fashion
the major questions about the relationship between law and develop-
ment, the core conception concerns itself with implementation.
The conception's ideas about the relationship between law and de-
velopment derive from its interpretation of the fact that the modem
legal system, the centralized state, and the industrial economy arose
in the West in the same historical period. From this historical observa-
tion, the core conception concludes that in some measure legal develop-
ment caused this associated political and economic transformation.
Finally, it believes that this asserted causal relationship will repeat
itself in the experience of the Third World.
In this section, these concepts will be analyzed. It will be argued
that by fleshing out the core conception's loose imputations of the
role for modem law in Western history, its assertion that Western
experience is necessarily a guide for the Third World can be refuted.
B. The Role of Law in the Development of the West:
The Work of lax Web ert 7
The key to this argument is the work of the German sociologist,
Max Weber, who attempted to identify and explain systematically the
42. David, supra note 7.
43. Lipstein, Conclusions, Reception of Foreign Law in Turkey, 9 IN-r'L SoC. SCI. BULL.
70, 72, 81 (1957). Lipstein concludes that "a Western system of law can be effectively in-
troduced in a country of a different cultural background if the law is codified .... "
Similarly, Rheinstein suggests that application of the Civil Code requires less of a law
library and less time to learn, and is, therefore, more easily extended to Africa than the
common law system. He notes that English law was introduced into India and British
East Africa in codified form. Rheinstein, supra note 7, at 244-45.
44. See Rosenn, supra note 7; Steiner, supra note 7.
45. MuRPnY, supra note 36, at 54-60; Steinberg, supra note 7, at 222.
46. Von Mehren, supra note 56. At least one American prescribed the same reform
elixir for legal "hypertension" in as developed and Westernized a country as Israel. Laufer,
Legal Education in Israel: A Visitor's View, 14 BuF. L. REv. 232 (1964).
47. See Trubek, Max Weber on Law and the Rise of Capitalism, 1972 IWs. L. Rn'.
720. See also R. B.NDIX, MAX VmELm AN I Thr C'cAx PoRTRArr 385-457 (1962).
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role of the modern legal system in the emergence of Western civiliza-
tion.48 Weber's explanation went beyond the observation that legal
"development" occurred simultaneously with the political and eco-
nomic transformations that led to the industrial system and the cen-
tralized nation-state. Rather, he showed with precision that these
changes were mutually causative, supporting his historical conclusions
with an analytic explanation of the kind lacking in the core conception.
Weber's major intellectual concern was explaining the rise of capi-
talism and industrial civilization: Why, he asked, had they first de-
veloped in Europe? European law offered a partial explanation. As
he believed European law had special characteristics which were con-
ducive to capitalism, Weber had to demonstrate the uniqueness of the
legal order of the West.
His research led him to three basic conclusions. First, that the more
"rational" a legal system was, the more conducive it would be to the
emergence of a capitalist, industrial system. Second, that European
legal systems were more rational than those which had emerged in
other civilizations. Finally, that this legal rationalism existed in large
measure in Europe before the full development of the industrial eco-
nomic system. From these observations Weber concluded that Europe's
legal system was one of the factors responsible for the rise of capitalism.
Weber's concept of legal rationality is composed of three sub-vari-
ables: autonomy, conscious design, and universality. In Weber's
schema, a legal system is said to be rational to the extent that: (i) it is
autonomous from other spheres of society; (ii) the norms it formulates
and enforces are consciously wrought; and (iii) those norms are con-
sistently applied to all similar cases. Weber noted that in some sys-
tems norms are not consciously wrought but rather originate from
immutable tradition or the commands of an extraordinary, charismatic
leader. Similarly, he found that norms may not be applied by special-
ized professionals, but rather enforced by religious, political or other
elites. Finally, in some systems decisions are not subsumed under gen-
eral rules or related to prior precedents, but rather are made on an
ad-hoc basis.
Weber argued that the European system, on the other hand, com-
bined the three essential elements of legal rationality. As a result, it,
48. Weber's most significant attempt to deal with the interrelationships between law
and what we call today "development" or "modernization" is contained in his outline
of interpretative sociology, WIRTSCHAFT UND GESELLSCHAFr. GRUNDRISS DER VERSTEIIENDEN
SOZIOLOGIE (4th ed. J. Winckelmann ed. 1956). In this discussion I have relied prhnarlly
on the recent English edition of the complete work, M. NVEDER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY
(Roth and Wittich eds. 1968) [hereinafter cited as ECONOMY AND SoCIETY .
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and it alone, developed a type of legal thought termed "logically for-
mal rationality"-the decisive indication, for Weber, of a modem sys-
tem. A "rational" system, therefore, relies on pre-existing rules to
resolve social conflict and guarantees that these rules will be (i)
elaborated by a specialized profession, using distinctive modes of
thought, (ii) consistent with one another, (iii) universal, and (iv)
precise. Although the source of these rules is total social life, the sys-
tem that elaborates and applies them is differentiated from other forms
of normative ordering or social control. Its rules are formulated inde-
pendently of religious or narrowly political considerations. Thus,
Weber's model of a "rational" system is, in large measure, the same
one set forth by the core conception as "modern law."
49
But while he employed a concept of modern law similar to that of
the core conception, Weber carried his analysis of the developmental
significance of law much further. In contrast to contemporary analysts,
he explained why a rational legal system fostered economic develop-
ment and a centralized state. In so doing, he made precise the condi-
tions under which "modem law" causes economic and political change.
In his economic sociology, Weber stressed two important relation-
ships between "rational" law and economic development. He found
that this type of normative system had formal and substantive char-
acteristics which were essential in the industrial system which emerged
in the West. A rational legal system was highly predictable; only such
a normative order could generate certain substantive provisions neces-
sary to the industrialized system. These characteristics were essential
to the operation of a free market economy. Such markets could not
operate if men were subject to traditional prescription; yet they re-
quired some normative structure to constrain egoistic tendencies.
The system had to be authoritative, that is, capable of effectively con-
straining behavior which conflicts with its prescriptions. Yet given
the nature of economic decision-making in a market system, it also
had to be predictable: When one must make rapid decisions based on
forecasts of another's behavior, it is essential that he know which norms
constrain others and that those norms will be enforced.
Although his explanation stressed formal characteristics-particu-
49. I believe that most American readers of Weber have been misled by his stress
on "legal thought" as an index of legal modernity, and his interpretation of con-
tinental legal science as the acme of rational legal thought. They are naturally unwill-
ing to accept his judgment that the common law tradition is an inferior form of "modern
law"; indeed, they consider the common law legal process more rational. By focusing
on the difference between these ideological pictures of the two legal worlds, the) have
failed to see that functionally the Weberian model and the American or modem law
model are similar in many respects.
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larly formal predictability-Weber was also concerned with the gen-
eration of substantive rules and principles. Chief among these was the
complex of rules that allowed freedom of contract and guaranteed the
enforcement of individually bargained agreements.
The only system of normative ordering that could meet these formal
and substantive requirements was rational law. Only an autonomous,
consciously designed set of universal rules could be (i) precise enough
to be integrated into economic decision-making, (ii) applied with suf-
ficient consistency to be predictable, and (iii) legitimate enough to
be authoritative. Furthermore, in his political sociology Weber ex-
plained the political conditions under which such a normative system
could emerge: a centralized, bureaucratic state which secured men's
loyalties through a claim that its decisions were rational.
Weber identified three "ideal types"5 0 of political systems (forms
of domination). He classified them according to their basic claim to
legitimacy: traditional, charismatic, and legal. According to this tri-
chotomy, members of a social organization will view societal com-
mands as legitimate because they are issued in accordance with immu-
table custom, are decreed by an individual with extraordinary or ex-
emplary characteristics, or rest on rational, legal enactment. Since
legal decisions are part of the total structure of domination, they, like
all actions of the rulers, must be legitimized by making some basic
claim to men's loyalties.
As a result, the structure of domination and the legal system are
mutually determinative: Traditional regimes apply norms thought to
be immutable and sacred; charismatic systems claim that their norms
are derived from the inspired, exemplary leader. Such ties make it
impossible to develop legal structures that meet Weber's criteria of
rationality. The very concepts of tradition and charisma are incon-
sistent with the idea of consciously wrought norms. Moreover, tradi-
tional and charismatic regimes have an inherent need to make ad hoc,
particularistic decisions and promote specific programs; as a result,
they cannot tolerate legal autonomy and are hostile to any insistence
on universality.
This is not, however, the case with rational or legal domination.
This type of regime finds its legitimacy in its capacity to create and
50. The term "ideal-type" is an intellectual construct employed in the social sciences.
It does not denote a normatively desirable situation. Rather, such a concept is "Ideal"
because it represents an abstraction of certain salient features of social life the
scientist wishes to explore. In Weber's work, ideal type was meant to denote a value-
nbutral scientific instrument. See R. ARON, 2 MAIN CURRENTS IN SOCIOLOGIAL TitOUcirT
201-04, 205 (1967).
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maintain universal rules governing social life. Legal domination leads
to the modem bureaucratic state which, far from being hostile to
formal rationality, actively requires and encourages it. For these rea-
sons, Weber concluded that the truly bureaucratic state could emerge
only in Europe where all the prerequisites for rational law existed.
Similarly, he argued that only under such a bureaucratic state could
these elements develop into the final model of European law. Thus,
Weber answered his original question about the causal relationship
between law and capitalism. Rational law fostered the competitive
market system; the rise of the market in turn encouraged further
rationalization of the law, a rationalization which made possible the
development of the centralized nation-state.
Weber's analysis cannot, of course, be accepted as established his-
torical fact. While he adduced substantial evidence to support his
thesis, he himself qualified his conclusions and admitted that there was
at least one case which it did not explain. 1 Nevertheless, until refuted,
his explanation stands as the most convincing and coherent analysis
of the causal relationship between law and development in the West.
The nature of Weber's explanation helps to identify a major flaw
in the core conception's reasoning-its contention that legal develop-
ment will in some way cause political and economic development.
Modem law thinkers frequently invoke Weber, arguing that his an-
alysis supports their conclusions.52 Yet in fact just the opposite is true;
rather than supporting the core conceptign, the Weberian thesis sug-
gests that it is, at best, without rational foundation, and, at worst,
simply wrong.
Weber's analysis shows that law's relation to development is actu-
ally determined by two intervening variables: Modem law does not
produce economic development; it merely helps structure the free
market system. Moreover, modern law does not bring about political
development; it merely supports the centralized bureaucratic state
which depends for its legitimacy on a belief that its decisions are ra-
tional. To the extent, therefore, that economic development in the
Third World is not based on free markets Weber's work cannot sup-
port any inference that modem law as defined by the core conception
51. That case was England, which was the first nation to develop capitalism, 'et
which never achieved what Weber would consider true "logically formal rationality." For
more complete discussions of Weber's "England Problem" see Trubek. supra note 47. at
746-48, and J. Guben, "The England Problem" and the Theory of Economic Development
(unpublished Yale Law School Program in Law and Modernization Working Paper No.
9, 1972).
52. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 7, at 29, 50, 51; Kozolchyk, supra note 7, at 742-
43 n.204; Steinberg, supra note 7, at 216.
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will cause or contribute to economic development.53 And to the extent
that Third World nations do not seek legitimacy through adherence
to the rule of law, there is no assurance that strengthening the legal
system will enhance the efficacy of the regime.
Thus, if we accept Weber's explanation of the relationship between
formal rationality and European industrialization, we must conclude
that the core conception is on very weak grounds. We know that few
Third World nations have developed competitive markets, and none
have primarily market-oriented or laissez-faire economic policies. If
modem law contributes to economic growth only under these condi-
tions, as Weber suggests, the core conception's assumption that West-
ern history will repeat itself is probably wrong. Similarly, we know
that Third World regimes are legitimated by many things, but that
their adherence to the rule of law is not first among them. Thus, a
conclusion that enhancing the effectiveness of the legal system as a
restraint on the state will enhance the effective power of Third World
leaders (as Weber argued it strengthened the European nation-state)
is also rather dubious.
C. Ethnocentricity and Evolutionism: Dangers and Dilemmas
of the Core Conception
The core conception is clearly ethnocentric in interpreting diverse
cultures in terms of Western history. It is evolutionist in viewing his-
tory as a series of identical stages repeated in all societies. As a result
of these implicit assumptions, the conception cannot deal effectively
with the realities of legal life in the Third World. This section iden-
tifies some of its errors and inconsistencies, and in so doing, casts fur-
ther light on both the origins and limitations of the core conception.
1. The Conflict Between Evolutionism and Reformism
There is a clear conflict between the core conception's evolutionism
and its commitment to legal reform, a conflict which reveals a great
deal about the motivations behind the core conception.
History, in the core conception, tends toward a knowable result in
uniform stages. Societies are classified as traditional or modern, under-
53. Some writers have defined "modern law" in such sweeping terms that this analysis
is inapposite. For example, though he seems at times aware that law is separate anti
distinct from the state, Friedman defines law as any public process within society. Fried-
man, supra note 7, at 15. Thus if state action can contribute to economic growth, so will
"modern law."
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developed or developed, static or dynamic,a4 and are viewed as inte-
grated systems in which sub-systems have related characteristics. A
"traditional society" will have a "traditional" legal system; "modern"
societies have modern law.55 Change is seen as an organic process:
Like the life cycle of the butterfly, "development" proceeds through
highly distinct stages to a defined end.5°
This type of determinism assumes that law merely results from and
reflects social and economic phenomena.57 The core conception can-
not accept such a view of the origins of legal development. Rather,
it must see legal change as possible without, and as potentially capable
of causing, social change. Modern law thought goes to great lengths to
make legal development a very problematic matter: Nascent legalism
in the Third World is perceived as a very fragile flower requiring hot-
house care.
Thus, a paradox is created. While modern law thinking argues that
the rest of the world will repeat the Western experience of simultane-
ous legal and socioeconomic development, it also presupposes that
legal development is not guaranteed and that strenuous efforts must
therefore be made to ensure that modern law is adopted.
If one's primary commitment were to the view that economic, social
and political change does not necessarily lead to modem law and that
conscious legal development is needed if the Third World is to follow
the West, one might quite logically abandon the whole structure of
evolutionary thought.58 In such a conception, "modem law" would be
seen not as a necessary prerequisite to change in other spheres, nor
even as the inevitable result of such change, but as merely something
that is possible under certain historical conditions.50 But while the
54. See C. BLAcst, supra note 15; Friedman, supra note 7. at 30; .Mendelson, supra note
7, passim; cf. p. 10 and note 40.
55. See Galanter, supra note 7, passim; Rheinstein. supra note 7. at 222-26. Steinberg
seems to accept this view, but notes that colonial administrations may have led to a law
"out of phase" with the indigenous culture. Steinberg, supra note 7. at 216-19.
56. On the use of organic metaphors in social theory, see R. Nismr, SOCtAL CiIM.r.E
AND HisroRY (1969).
57. Thus it resembles a model of development with unlimited supplies of law. See
note 5 supra.
58. That is, one might see society as made up of relatively distinct spheres which are
only related to one another in a very loose fashion. This would mean abandoning the
idea that there are parallel stages of development of all aspects of society, and the as-
sumption that there are strong forces of social integration that tend to bind separate
spheres together.
59. This approach to law-society relationships would entail a number of intellectual
shifts and solve certain problems of the core conception. For example, it would better
explain how societies can-as they clearly do-go through periods of rapid economic
development without a corresponding spurt of "legal development." Moreover, this ap-
proach and the abandonment of evolutionary determinism would bring to the surface
the fact that the commitment to "modem law," and its export to the Third World, in-
volves a distinct set of value choices. This, in turn, might focus scholarly attention on
the nature and implications of these values.
HeinOnline  -- 82 Yale L.J. 17 1972-1973
The Yale Law Journal
determinism of the evolutionary scheme conflicts with the strongly-
held faith in reformist intervention, the core conception adheres to
both. It attempts to solve this inherent conflict by positing the pos-
sibility of "lags" or "barriers" to "legal development" which, it is
asserted, can retard evolutionary change yet be overcome by vigorous
reformism.00 Thus, the modern law. thinker can observe that the legal
code of country X has "failed to keep up" with economic and social
changes, that its lawyers employ "outmoded" ideas about the law, or
that its legal education is "antiquated."' 61 The idea of lags and barriers
maintains the need for conscious efforts to identify and "overcome"
them. Yet at the same time these concepts assume that there is some
"normal" process of change that is being frustrated.
One reason that modern law thinking clings to both evolutionism
and reformism is the utility these perceptions have in justifying the
role of the foreigner prescribing law reform measures. Such a reformer,
writing a code for a developing nation or advising it on how to reform
its legal education, must argue that legal development is problematic-
otherwise he has no role. Yet he must also retain evolutionism, as it
serves two key functions. First, it tends to remove any suggestion that
there are normative questions at stake: Modern law is merely the un-
folding of history. Second, the evolutionary concept means that the
foreigner from a "developed," "modem" nation has a special exper-
tise to offer the "traditional," "underdeveloped" one: He has seen the
future and he knows how it works. Thus, he is indispensable to legal
development.
From this perspective, it is possible to understand why modern law
thought contains apparently contradictory strands. To legitimize for-
eign involvement in the legal life of the Third World, it must be simul-
taneously reformist and evolutionary, voluntaristic and deterministic.
2. An Instance of Ethnocentricity: Legal Instrumentalism
versus the Democratic State
Evolutionism obscures the normative choices necessarily involved in
legal development programs. Yet ethnocentricity may increase the dif-
ficulty of designing projects which foster consciously held values. Be-
cause the modern law thinker's vision is clouded with concepts from
60. See, e.g., David, supra note 7, at 194, 203.04; Kozolchyk, supra note 7, at 751;
Steinberg. supra note 7, at 25-52; KOnz, supra note 7, at 97, 98; Trubek, supra note 7,
at 24-28, 52-53.
61. David, supra note 7, at 203; Karst, supra note 7, at 19-20; K6nz, supra note 7, at
99; Kozolchyk, supra note 7, at 746; Rheinstein, supra note 7, at 226; Rosenn, supra note
7, at 254-55; Steinberg, supra note 7, at 245; Steiner, supra note 7, at 70-72.
Vol. 82: 1, 1972
HeinOnline  -- 82 Yale L.J. 18 1972-1973
Toward a Social Theory of Law
his own society on the nature of law and its functions, he may actually
propose measures counterproductive in the societies of others.
Consider the case of education projects designed to foster purposeful
legal thought. American scholars, government agencies, and private
foundations promoting such efforts assume that they will strengthen
the "rule of Law" and foster democratic values.02 The core conception
refuses to recognize any other possibility and assumes that the result-
ing shift from a traditional concept of law to an instrumental one will
simultaneously increase the state's capacity to guide social behavior
and the legal system's capacity to restrain arbitrary executive action.
0 3
Thus, the core conception argues that measures to increase legal pur-
posiveness will both foster legal autonomy and strengthen liberal and
democratic tendencies.
4
Increasing instrumentalism may, in fact, have quite the opposite
effect. Efforts to render legal thinking more instrumental may make
the legal order incrtasingly dependent on state apparatus,05 and when
authoritarian groups seize control of that apparatus, such dependence
will strengthen their position.( This will occur when instrumentalism
erodes the legitimacy of autonomous legal thought, and thus denies
judges and lawyers any valid premise for decision-making other than
that of implementing state policy. Instrumental thought is a technique
of selecting appropriate means for given ends. 7 Thus it is a tool, a
means by which specific goals are achieved. But under authoritarian
conditions it may be a tool which is dependent in the final analysis on
the goals supplied by the state. Since it cannot supply its own goals,
increasing instrumentalism in legal thought decreases legal autonomy.
As the core conception makes clear, it is the very nature of "modem
society" that non-state sources of norms and values are weakened. This
tendency can become especially acute in developing nations, where
pressures for rapid growth enhance the dominance of the state.
62. This core concept is often hidden from public and published view. But see D.
TRUBEK, J. Gouv.A VlnlRA & P. S., supra note 7, at 80; Mlurphy, supra note 36, at 57-58;
Rosenn, supra note 7, at 283; Steiner, supra note 7, at 70.82.
63. See A. RiVKIN, supra note 27; Karst, supra note 7, at 18-19; Steinberg, supra note
7, at 247-48.
64. See Karst, supra note 7, at 15-19; Steinberg, supra note 7, at 247-48.
65. See Unger, supra note 8, at sec. 3.51.
66. See F. NEU.ANN, The Change in the Function of Law in Modern Society. in TlE
DEFiocATIC AND THE AuTHoarTrAN STATE 22 (1957). Critics of legal positivism have long
stressed the debilitating effects which this school's view of law has on the lawycr's
ability to resist the inroads of authoritarian and undemocratic forces which have gained
control of the instruments of the state. See L. FULLr.R, THE L',w IN QUEsr oF l-rsrL 120-
25 (1940); see also Auerbach, Legal Tasks for the Sociologist, in LA'A. &%D TiE BEItA'lO.AL
SciF.xcas 18, 19-20 (L. Friedman.& S. Macaulay eds. 1969).
67. See 1 ECONOMY AND SocIETY, at 24, 26, 30.
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Consequently, purposeful legal thought must confront a dilemma
which may ultimately destroy its claim to autonomy: If the state is
the only valid source of essential goals, legal thought can find no basis
for resistance to the state. Shorn of any transcendent premises on which
to base its reasoning, the legal system becomes a mere instrument of
state power.
Although some European scholars were acutely aware of this prob-
lem, 68 contemporary modern law literature has only begun to recog-
nize the possible conflict between legal autonomy and instrumental-
ism.69 The core conception's failure to realize fully this potential con-
flict is further proof of its ethnocentricity. The assumption that instru-
mentalism is necessary for the effective operation of an autonomous
legal system is simply a generalization from American conditions,
resting on the fact that American legal thought assumes the existence
of a pluralist political system. 70 In American pluralist theory, "the
state" is not viewed as an entity distinct, and hierarchically superior
to, social life, but rather as a system or process which organizes and
guides an ongoing struggle between competing and conflicting groups.
"Government," in this view, is both the structure that maintains
pluralist competition and the policy output that results from it. 1
In a pluralist society, "law" can be seen in large measure as the re-
sult of this competitive process. 72 The political process resolves (or
avoids) potential group conflict, and law is its final and authoritative
settlement. It is, in this sense, a contractual manifestation of the com-
promise of competing forces. Furthermore, in a pluralist society, law
is also the set of rules, primarily constitutional, which structure this
process of group formation and competition. But pluralism will work
only if all legitimate groups have an opportunity to be heard; indeed
68. Commenting on the decline of natural law and the rise of a view of law as a
technical instrument, Weber observed:
This extinction of the metajuristic implications of the law is one of those ideological
developments which, while they have increased scepticism towards the dignity of the
particular rules of a concrete legal order, have also effectively promoted the actual
obedience to the power, now viewed solely from an instrumentalist standpoint, of
the authorities who claim legitimacy at the moment. Among the practitioners of the
law this attitude has been particularly pronounced.
2 ECONOMY & SoCIETY, supra note 48, at 875. See also F. NEUMANN, supra note 66.
69. See Unger, supra note 65. See also Steiner, supra note 7, at 50.
70. This point was suggested to me by Lawrence Friedman.
71. See Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy and the Supreme Court: Some Intersections
between Law and Political Science, 20 STAN. L. REV. 169, 250-57 (1968).
72. I have in mind here primarily statutory law. The relationship between judge.
made law and pluralism is somewhat more complex. A substantial amount of our con.
stitutional law theory, for example, recognizes that our commitment to pluralism and
our commitment to a creative role for the judiciary may be in conflict. See, e.g., Clark
& Trubek, The Creative Role of the Judge: Restraint and Freedom in the Conmion Lawo
Tradition,. 71 YALE L.J. 255 (1961); Deutsch, supra note 71.
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much of constitutional law is aimed at guaranteeing that groups can
be organized, that their views will be recognized and occasionally
adopted, and that the compromises reached will be accepted as
legitimate.
To the extent that law is viewed as the result of this competitive
process of pluralistic interaction, instrumental legal thought becomes
not an enemy of democratic values and individual liberty, but rather a
necessary way to maintain them. Under the conditions posited by plu-
ralist theory, instrumental legal thought does not expand the power of
the "state"; to the contrary, it serves to keep government from ex-
ceeding the bounds established by pluralism. To the extent that the
only valid goals are those which arise out of, or preserve the pluralist
process, instrumentalism limits the government to those measures
which further the compromises struck in the legislative arena. Since
there is no other value to override such goals, lawyers are properly
trained to identify them clearly and to relate them to specific meas-
ures. In so doing, they serve to preserve the pluralist system. There
is thus no conflict between instrumentalism and democracy.
However, where political pluralism is not institutionalized, the effect
of instrumentalism is very different. Indeed, in the absence of plural-
ism, legal thought relying on formalistic or traditional arguments may
be a more effective way to resist authoritarian measures. The core
conception with its implicit pluralism is unable to deal with non-
pluralist situations-situations which are, of course, the norm, not the
exception, in the Third World.
III. Towards a New Intellectual Perspective: The Challenge
and Future of Research on Law and Modernization
A. The Challenge: Learning from the Core Conception
While the core conception has failed to yield a satisfactory social
theory of law, we can learn from it. After all, "law and development'
might have been defined merely as the exportation of legal systems
or as country-specific social engineering: The core conception at least
attempts to formulate valid generalizations about the relationships be-
tween law and the major economic, social, and political transformations
associated with industrialization. Moreover, it has approached this task
through an attempt to delineate key variables and define their rela-
tionships. Accordingly, when it posits a distinction between "modern"
and "traditional" legal systems, and explains these variations in terms
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of the level or stage of social development, the core conception articu-
lates a crude social theory. Although we may question the ethnocen-
tric model employed, and the objectivity of its observation of alleged
differences, some form of general classification and some type of ex-
planation of observed differences are essential to any genuine social
theory of law.
Moreover, the core conception does articulate certain theoretical
generalizations that are beyond question. Most Third World nations
are committed to some form of industrialization; and there are un-
doubtedly universals which will lead to some convergence with indus-
trialized Western societies. Similarly, when modern law thinkers assert
that in the transition from traditional to industrial society govern-
mental processes become more purposive and rational, few would take
issue.
Unfortunately, these conclusions are so broad that they have little
analytic or practical utility. If we wish to develop more precise and
concrete ideas about law and development, we must go beyond the
core conception. Since its evolutionism contains no coherent idea about
the causal relationships between legal and social phenomena, modern
law thought is never clear which factor causes the other. The core
conception circumvents analysis of the co-variation between legal and
other variables and discourages causal enquiry.
B. Beyond the Core Conception: Learning from Weber
What is needed, then, is an intellectual perspective which will tran-
scend these limits, a paradigm for future work. This must be a social
theory capable of formulating and verifying propositions about the
relationship between legal and social variables. It should start from the
assumption that there are systematic and universal relations between
such variables and address itself to the task of uncovering them. So
the question becomes: How may law and development be studied
in a more systematic way? To answer, we must examine several pos-
sible criteria and suggest strategies for movement to a more scientific
approach.
First, it is rather clear that the phenomena with which we are con-
cerned cannot be studied experimentally. 'We obviously cannot manip-
ulate the behavior of nations in order to determine the interaction of
social change and law. We can, however, employ a methodology of
comparative research to isolate the underlying relationships between
Vol. 82: 1, 1972
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legal and social variables.73 This is, of course, the method Weber
employed. His ideal types both define key variables and indicate
relationships among them. His typology of law permitted him to dif-
ferentiate among different legal systems in terms of relative rationality.
The ideal types of legal domination and the market economy simul-
taneously identify important political and economic variables and posit
causal relationships between them and the legal order, 4
Having hypothesized these relationships, Weber conducted com-
parative studies to prove, for example, that only societies with rational
law had bureaucratic staffs, that no society with a traditional or patri-
monial form of domination developed rational law, or that no society
lacking rational law developed an industrial economy. Such historical
evidence that certain variables always occurred together, or never ap-
peared simultaneously, supported his conclusions on causationY"
While many of Weber's conceptions and propositions are question-
able in light of current knowledge, his approach can be a guide for our
own efforts.76 At its most ambitious, our program should be guided
by the following criteria. First, in order to analyze the relationships
between law and other variables, we must separate "legal" phenom-
ena from key social variables which interact with them. With these
key variables in mind, we must construct ideal types. Further, if com-
parative study is to determine the relationship between variables, they
must be so defined to be both comparable and operational. Thus, legal
and social variables should be set forth in terms which guarantee that
similar things are observed in all societies and that discrete states or
quantities of the variables can be observed and measured. Finally, it
must be possible to go beyond the establishment of mere correlations to
true causal analysis. That is, it must be possible to posit the dependent
and independent variables in our theory of law and development.
The remainder of the essay is primarily concerned with the first of
these criteria, developing a set of ideal types which identify relation-
73. See, e.g., COmPARATIVE METHODS IN SOCIOLOGY: Fss.,LYs ON TRENos AND APPLICA-
TIONS (I. Vallier ed. 1971). This volume includes a comprehensive bibliography on com-
parative studies.
74. Weber's typology of domination, for example, identifies as key variables the degree
of legal rationality, the nature of the regime's claim to legitimacy, and the t)pe of ad-
ministrative staff associated with the ruler. See Trubek, supra note 47.
75. While sociologists may recognize that this is a controversial interpretation of
Weber's methodology, the text follows substantially the interpretation of Weber in R.
Warner, The Methodology of Max 'Weber's Comparative Studies (unpublished 1972 Ph.D.
dissertation on file with the Yale Law Journal). But see IV. RUNCMAN, A COUQtE OF
MAX WVEBER'S PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (1972).
76. Unlike modem law thought, Weber dissected society into component spheres, posit-
ing mutual interactions among the spheres of law, polity, social structure, and economy.
This scheme enabled him to identify causal relationships with greater specificity than
the core conception's two-variable system allows.
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ships between legal and other variables in contemporary moderniza-
tion. In this analysis, I have attempted to provide a preliminary ty-
pology of two key sub-systems of any modernizing state, the economy
and polity. Their variables are then related to differences in legal
structures. Such analysis and concept formulation is a necessary pre-
cursor to, but not a substitute for, the future formulation and verifi-
cation of precise propositions through comparative and empirical
research.
The study of law and development is far from producing any sys-
tematic theory. The necessary comparative studies must await the
accumulation of much more data about legal life in the Third World.
The ideal types set forth in the remainder of this essay are meant to
help shape such efforts.
IV. Economic Organization and Legal Structure:
Market vs. Command
What is the relationship between law and the economy in the Third
World? To answer, we need a broader perspective than has been here-
tofore offered. Most analysis of law and development, from Weber to
the core conception, stresses the contrast between traditional and in-
dustrial economies, but obscures the fact that the traditional economy
is largely a thing of the past. All nations now aspire to increase their
level of economic well-being through industrialization. What is more
crucial today is that there are many roads to such development, and
a society can adopt very different means for its industrial drive. This
choice, in turn, will significantly affect the structure and function of
the nation's legal system.
Thus, the social theory of law must differentiate between economic
structures. To do so, we begin with a crude typology which identifies
two radically different approaches to the relationships between state
and economic activity. These types are called "market" and "com-
mand. ' 77 To the extent that production priorities are set by autono-
mous entities based on prices established through exchange, the eco-
nomic organization is termed "market." To the extent that such de-
cisions are made by the state, it is called "command."78
77. The following discussion is based on a number of sources. I found COMIAnATtVE
ECONOMIC SYSTEMS (M. Bornstein ed. rev. ed. 1969) and F. KNIGiHT, TIlE ECONOMIC OR-
GANIZATION (1934) especially useful.
78. The theoretical distinction between "command" and "market" and their related
legal phenomena are ideal types used to analyze empirical reality, rather than depict It.
In the capitalist world, while markets play a major role, the pure "market" structure of
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In the pure market system, the economy is clearly separated from the
polity. The economic system is perceived as a self-contained sub-system
capable of functioning with only the most minimal state intervention.
Economic activity is managed by independent units responding to the
signals of impersonal markets. The market is theoretically capable of
deciding all questions about production and allocation; since con-
sumer decisions determine ultimate production, the system functions
to give people "what they want." While the state may provide some
services like defense and education which the market either cannot
provide or provides inefficiently, all other economic decisions are left
to autonomous, presumably private, bodiesY7
In the command economy, there is no such division between state
and economy. In the extreme, the economy completely merges with
the state; in other command systems, the market is retained but merely
as an instrument of economic policy or measuring rod of desirable
state action. What really distinguishes command from market is that
in the command economy state decisions are the ultimate arbiters of
economic activity, i.e., all matters of production, allocation and dis-
tribution.
A. "Law" in a Pure Market System: Voluntary Commitment
Since the pure market system eschews any role for the state in eco-
nomic life, it is not immediately apparent why law should have any
economic function at all. Of course, public law is necessary to define
the limits of state action. But the economic role of private law, that is,
the rules which govern relations between individual market actors,
is far from clear. Yet the rules of contract, tort, and property do con-
strain (at least in part) the decisions of economic actors. How is this
competitive, laissez-faire capitalism has been replaced by economies wherein large, often
oligopolistic industries predominate, and government regulation of industry is the rule
and not the exception. See, e.g., P. SAMUELSON, Ecoso.tics 487-89, 500-07, 140-41 (8th ed.
1970). In the socialist world, the model of a command economy has had a strong impact.
See generally ComPARATivE EcoNoMfic Sys-rE.s, supra note 77. Yet sonic socialist systems
consciously use market structures to achieve certain economic results. See Bicanic, Eco-
nomics of Socialism in a Developed Country, id. at 222-35; Dirlam, Problems of Market
Power and Public Policy in Yugoslavia, id. at 236-51; Lange, On the Economic Theory
of Socialism, id. at 68-76; Montias, East European Economic Reforms, id. at 324-36. In
the Third World, the idea of economic planning and regulation has spread to even the
most market-oriented governments. See, e.g., G. MYRDAL, AN APPROACH TO THE ASIAN
DRAMiA (1970) especially ch. 15. While a more sophisticated typology than the market.
command is clearly desirable, the dualistic typology is better than none at all. Yet we
must always be cautious in employing such primitive tools; one of the greatest dangers
is the tendency to think that our two types encompass all possible relations being
charted here, state and economy. No such claim is being made for the two types employed.
79. In the pure market system, state economic activity, such as anti-trust law, may
affect the market, but only to maintain its structure and smooth functioning.
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consistent with a market theory which stresses the necessary autonomy
of such decisions?
The answer lies in an inherent conflict within the market, a con-
flict which law alone can resolve. In the pure market system economic
actors or units strive to increase their own resources under the prin-
ciple of profit maximization. While increasing profit may result from
a net increase in total resources, competition also involves a struggle
in which each unit seeks to gain at the expense of others. Yet the com-
peting units are simultaneously dependent on one another: Given
the division of labor and other complexities of modern economies,
the greatest possibilities for economic gain lie in each unit's ability
to secure the cooperation of others. For example, unless the unit that
controls steel producing equipment can secure the cooperation of
those who control iron ore and coal (not to mention those who "con-
trol" labor power), no amount of self-seeking activity will avail them
in their search for profits.
The instrument that initially resolves this conflict is exchange
through markets.80 But while the initial act of exchange may resolve
primary conflict, the matter does not end there. Exchange, rarely
instantaneous, often involves promises of future transfers. Thus, each
unit's control of resources depends in large measure on the future
behavior of other actors. The unit's effective control derives from its
ability to predict that in specific situations others will act, or refrain
from acting, in certain ways.81
A fundamental tension thus emerges between the dynamic of profit
maximization and the connection of control with predictability. To
the extent that each actor seeks to maximize his own position, it makes
no sense to honor yesterday's commitment if more is to be gained by
repudiating it and assuming another. 2 Yet each autonomous actor
needs the assurance of others that they will not break their commit.
ments, for if past promises yield to present possibilities, the system will
be destroyed.
In the pure market model, legal coercion is the only form of social
control that can resolve this conflict. Market actors are presumed to
80. "Rationally-oriented exchange is the resolution of a previously open or latent
conflict of interests by means of a compromise." 1 ECONOMY AND SOCIErY, supra note
48, at 72.
81. See id. at 67-68. "Economic action," as Weber defines it, requires that actors have
the power of control and disposal over economic resources. In a "modern private enter-
prise economy" this is achieved through "legal protection of such powers held by
autonomous and autocephalous economic units." Id. at 67.
82. As Lon Fuller has put it, "Before the principle of marginal utility nothing Is
sacred; all existing arrangements are subject to being reordered in the interest of In-
creased economic return." L. FUu I.a, THE MORALITY OF LAw 28 (1964).
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be self-interested maximizers, indifferent to either traditional or ethical
constraints. Some system which can exercise coercion is essential to
them to keep from furthering their self-interest at the cost of others.8 3
The argument that this coercion must be applied by the state is based
on historical observation. While it may be possible to structure coer-
cion in other ways, this has, by and large, not occurred. In part, this is
due to the success of the market itself, which erodes many of the tra-
ditional foci of authority which might have substituted for the state.8'
It is also related to the development of the state, which has, for obvi-
ous reasons, attempted fo monopolize the use of force. As a result,
market societies tend to lack sources of coercion outside the state,
and the pure market model must, accordingly, rely on state coercion
through private law as its chief instrument of social control.
A second justification for legal coercion results from the pace of
economic activity and the rational calculations characteristic of a mar-
ket economy. It is not enough for the capitalist to have a general idea
that someone will probably deliver more or less the amount of a
good purchased on or about the time stipulated. He must know that
specific performance will be forthcoming. But given the potential
conflict between self-interest and obligation, this means that the busi-
nessman must know that coercion will be applied to the recalcitrant,
and that potential contract violators, trespassers, or tort-feasors are
similarly aware that such behavior will be held liable.
But it is not enough for the state to provide a coercive framework
for economic activity. Given the need for predictability, the state itself
must act in a calculable way. State coercion must be "legal," that is,
based on general rules uniformly applied. For this reason the legal
system of a pure market system must be autonomous from the state.
To the extent that the legal system is kept free of intermittant politi-
cal influences, its results will be highly predictable; but when it is
83. This sociological analysis of market behavior in terms of the inevitability of con-
flicts between self-seeking individuals in market societies, and the need for coercion in
market relations, is drawn from Weber and Parsons. See 1 EcoNo.ty AND SOCIM, supra
note 48, at 3-62; T. Pagsoxs, THE ST-ucruaE oF SOCIAL AcMON 89 (1968); Parsons, et al.,
Some Fundamental Categories of The Theory of Action: A General Statement, in To.
WARD A GENERAL.. THEORY OF ATION (Tr. Parsons & E. Shils eds. 1967); Trubek, supra note
47. Some contemporary lawyers and economists have assumed that there are no neces-
sary conflicts in market relationships, except those caused by "transaction costs." See
Calabresi, Transaction Costs; Resource Allocation and Liability Rules. J. LAw & Eco..
67 (1968); Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L ,w & EcoN. 1 (1960). While it would
be ideal to merge these sociological and economic perspectives into one systematic view
on the law's role in economic behavior, it seems advisable at this stage for each approach
to develop along its own lines, bearing in mind the contributions of complementary fields.
Cf. N. SmELsER, EsSSAYs IN SOCIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION 3-44 (1968).
84. 2 Ecoxo.sv AND SoctEr, supra note 48,,at 635-40.
HeinOnline  -- 82 Yale L.J. 27 1972-1973
The Yale Law Journal
subject to interference by those who seek to apply coercion for pur-
poses inconsistent with the rules, it loses its predictability.,
This autonomous legal system will have characteristic structures,
such as general rules applied to all economic actors similarly situated.
It will become highly differentiated from social life and the other
aspects of the state apparatus. It will also be associated with character-
istic ideas about the nature of law-ideas which seek to legitimate
legal coercion. As Weber made clear, no system of order effectively
constrains behavior solely by applying force. While coercive systems
must be prepared to penalize transgressors, they must also appeal to
men to obey their dictates without actual physical force. In a market
system, a coercive order must seek legitimacy through an appeal to
enlightened self-interest. Thus, law will be presented as mandated
by the selfish proclivities of market man, yet it will apply no more
constraint than is necessary to allow individuals to maximize their
preferences through interdependent economic activity. 0 In such a
system, law will not be viewed as coercion applied by external agen-
cies, but rather as immanent in, and arising from, society itself.
The constraints of law are accepted by all economic actors in the en-
lightened pursuit of self-interest; in the market conception, man's
commitment to law is voluntary.81
B. Law in a Pure Command System: Involuntary Commitment
While law in the market model can be identified as organized coer-
cion through general rules, one must employ a different concept in a
command economy. There, all economic decisions are made at the
center by one omnipotence; all economic institutions are part of a
single, hierarchical structure. The central organ does not pass laws
in the sense of general rules; rather, it issues more or less specific
85. The model of law and economics in the text is radically simplified, and must
be qualified. First, while it assumes that industrial societies lack any non.legal forms
of social control which can restrain egoistical conflicts in market situations, market so-
cieties do develop sets of normative ideas which constrain self-interested economic be-
havior without resort to formal, legal action. See, e.g., Macauley, Non-Contractual Rela-
tions in Business: A Prelininarv Study, 28 Ams. Soc. REV. 55 (1963). Second, the "en-
lightened self-interest" of the rational maximizing economic actor may make conventional
or legal coercion unnecessary. Id. at 61-65. Finally, as Weber pointed out, a truly
"legalistic" system will not always produce results favorable to business interests, which
may prefer substantive benefits to formal predictability. 2 EcoNoMv AND SocIErY, supra
note 48, at 885.
86. This perspective is set forth clearly by Bentham, the quintessential thinker of the
market tradition. See J. IBENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF TIlE CIVIL CODE 93-113. For a more
contemporary statement of this perspective, see, e.g., Michelman, Property, Utility and
Fairness: Comments on The Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 1-ARV.
L. R v. 1165 (1967).
87. For a definition of law as a constraint that men "impose upon themselves," see
L. FALLFRS, LAW WITHOUT PRECEDENT 2 (1969).
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directives to enterprises telling them how to carry out their economic
functions. These are often reflected in a plan, which is typically ex-
pressed in terms of the output of physical rather than monetary quan-
tities. In a number of ways, these directives resemble military orders:
The issuer is presumed to have authority over the recipient, who is
obligated to comply with the directives. The plan is binding on all
economic actors, and may be enforced by criminal sanctions, dismissal,
or demotion. In the pure command economy, the only thing equiva-
lent to "law" is this system of directives.
In a completely nationalized system, there would be, in theory, none
of the conflicts that are hypothesized to be the very nature of the
market economy. There would be, therefore, no need for legal coer-
cion as a conflict-resolving mechanism.88 Moreover, as the very essence
of the system is the implementation of state decisions about economic
activity, there is absolutely no need to shield economic actors from
state intervention. Such action is ex hypothesi the most rational form
of economic decision, and the problem for "law" is merely guarantee-
ing that these decisions are faithfully followed.
Since law in a command economy does involve coercion, it too must
seek some legitimization. However, the concepts of law associated with
command differ markedly from those prevalent in a market system.
The command system will have a teleological, instrumental concept
of law, viewing it as a means of achieving specific goals set forth in
the plan. The ultimate goal which legitimizes all legal coercion is the
plan itself. The plan, in turn, may be justified on scientific-technical,
or political-historical grounds.
Thus, law in a command system is viewed as something imposed
from without. It is expressly recognized to be the exercise of coercion
to achieve stated and highly-valued goals. It is not an expression of
something natural in society, but rather an instrument by which be-
havior is to be molded in conformity with new, consciously designed
standards. In the command system, one's commitment to law is in-
voluntary.
C. Law in the Mixed Economy
While the ideal types of market and command assist us in analyzing
the economic role of law in industrial or industrializing nations, no
88. Of course, in practice, conflicts do arise between the separate economic enter-
prises of even the most highly centralized economies. Nations like China and the Soviet
Union do have contract law, and institutions for resolution of contractual disputes. See
generally Loeber, Plan and Contract Performance in Soviet Law, 1964 U. oF ILL. LAiw
FORUM 128; Pfeffer, The Institution of Contracts in the Chinese People's Republic, Tit
CH A QUARTERLY 153, Apr.-June 1963 (Part I); and 115, July-Sept. 1963 (Part ).
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economy is either pure market or pure command. A more sophisti-
cated typology would thus probably specify several "mixed-economy"
types, and would accordingly permit a more discriminating compara-
tive analysis of law and development. Moreover it may be possible to
imagine systems that involve totally different relations than those sug-
gested in these two types.
Without waiting, however, for the construction of more sophisticated
schemes, we may suggest some of the phenomena characteristic of sys-
tems involving a mix of command and market. We should begin with
an examination of regulatory law, a typical form of state economic
involvement.
Regulatory law is a hybrid of the universal rules of pure market
and the specific directives of pure command: It is more specific than
the general rules that establish contract, tort and property rights;
yet more general than the specific directives of the command economy.
It is thus characteristic of economies where the state is not willing to
allow economic priorities to be set exclusively by the market, yet is
either unable or unwilling to assume complete control of economic
decisions.
Regulatory law consciously attempts to influence the decisions of eco-
nomic actors who are simultaneously subject to market constraints.
In such cases, economic decisions will be basically influenced by price
considerations, but such signals will be supplemented by law. A sim-
ple example of a regulatory law is the tax credit. The rules that estab-
lish credits for certain types of investments do not command that eco-
nomic units build low-income housing, invest in underdeveloped re-
gions, etc. But the benefits offered through such credits may, when
included in a cost-benefit analysis based on market and production
data, influence output decisions.89 Of course, most law in a market
system has some such effect. 90 For example, nineteenth-century tort
law affected the allocation of resources, even though the judges who
established liability rules might not have consciously planned to favor
certain industries or activities. The laws of contract and property, even
if not consciously designed to influence economic activity, have a simi-
lar effect.
Thus, in distinguishing regulatory from all economically relevant
89. For a discussion of this type of law in the context of an economic development
program, see D. TRUBEK, J. GouvEa VIEIRA, & P. SA, supra note 7, at 23-92.
90. Weber distinguished law as a "formal order" structuring economic activity and
as substantive regulation affecting resource allocation. See Trubek, supra note 47, at n.47.
He recognized, however, that even purely formal rules will have some accidental or
unintended effects on resource allocation.
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law, we must stress two dimensions. The first is explicitness of intent:
While general law will affect the allocation and distribution of re-
sources, regulatory law is consciously shaped to achieve relatively pre-
cise goals. The second dimension is the specificity of the provisions
enacted: Laws enacting tax credits or prescribing detailed rules for
the conduct of certain activities (for example, zoning law) will tend
to be more detailed and specific in defining acceptable and unaccept-
able behavior than more general bodies of law, and to entail a more
elaborate administrative machinery.
The rise of regulatory law in market systems can generate tensions
within the legal profession, since much regulatory law seems incon-
sistent with the market concept of law. Lawyers wedded to the pure
market model of law will see the rise of regulatory law as a threat to
law itself. In civil law countries, for example, as vast bodies of adminis-
trative regulations come and go, bereft of the coherence and precision
of traditional civil codes, scholars contend that regulatory legislation
lacks two elements essential to "law"-generality and permanence. 1
One Brazilian observer, reflecting his alarm, has characterized this type
of state decree as "legislation that is not yet law."92 In the United States
the tension between regulation and "law" has focused on the New Deal
regulatory agencies. While the regulations issued by these agencies
were frequently given a quasi-judicial cast, and appeared to represent a
merger between traditional law and government economic control,
several scholars expressed concern over the threat this control posed
for "law. ' 93 Indeed for some, regulatory "law" was a contradiction in
terms; the purpose and process of government economic control, they
felt, was totally inconsistent with any commitment to a system of uni-
versal rules.9
4
This legal discomfort can be viewed as a reflection of the emergence
in capitalist societies of the welfare state, with its broad commitment
to control and direction of economic activity. Seen in the context of
the polarity of market and command law, such fears reflect the under-
lying transition from a market to mixed system and the tensions en-
gendered thereby.
91. See, e.g., G. RIPERT, ASPECTS JURDIQUES DU C.PrrALLSME MODERNE 209-58 (1946).
92. See, e.g., Lamy Filho, Crise no ensino uridico, Si"rmse PoLrra, Eco.o.IzcA, So-
c.L., nos. 37-38 (1968).
93. See Reich, The Law of Tie Planned Society, 75 Yame L.J. 1227 (19A6). wherein
the author observes that by casting government regulation and planning in a legalistic
form, the New Deal hid the degree to which planning was actually being conducted.
Similarly, Lon Fuller observes that it is wasteful and unwise to adapt the model of
legalism to the task of governmental economic allocation. L. FULLER, supra note 82.
at 170-77.
94. See, e.g., F. HAYER, THE RoAD To SrE.Pxros 72-87 (1944).
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D. The Legal Structure of Contract Under Market and Command:
Private Right versus Public Policy
In order to see more precisely the utility of this typology, let us
examine the implications of market and command in one specific area.
The differences between the two legal systems are rather clear in the
economically significant institution of contract. In the pure market
system, contract is an institutional device fostering individual goals
and decisions. In the pure command system, it is just one more part
of the structure implementing state decisions.
A key feature of a market economy is its encouragement and pro-
tection of the freedom of contract. The contract system operates to
guarantee individual freedom to make production and consumption
decisions in response to prices and to ensure that these decisions will
be implemented. Underlying contract in market economies is a legal
system of private rights. The essence of this system is that the individual
is free to invoke (or not to invoke) the coercive power of the state to
enforce duties created by legal rules.
The system of private rights reflects a belief that such freedom is
essential for optimal economic performance. 0 Initial contracting deci-
sions must be left to the parties, as a contract will foster efficient re-
source allocation only if it represents voluntary choice. Similarly, indi-
viduals must be free to invoke or not to invoke legal sanctions. For
example, assume A and B enter into a contract, and B fails to per-
form. The system of private rights leaves A the option of suing. If
the value to A of the damages, discounted by the costs of suit (includ.
ing the loss of good will in continuing relations with B), is lower than
the value of forgetting the whole matter, A must be free to drop the
suit.
Thus, the freedoms not to contract and not to sue are equally essen-
tial to a market system. "Private rights," incorporating these "nega-
tive" freedoms, function to guarantee that a system of free-market
exchange will determine the utility of alternative economic possibili.
95. One of the major shifts in Western legal organization which' Weber observed
was the movement from the "status contract" to that of the "purposive contract." A
status contract, typical of traditional societies, affects the total legal position or social
status of the person involved, for example the contract between a serf and his lord.
Purposive contracts, as exemplified by the money contract in exchange economics, are"specific, quantitatively delimited, qualityless, abstract and usually economically condi.
tioned." 2 ECONOMY AND SociETY, supra note 48, at 674. While Weber's typology may
explain the role of contract in the rise of capitalism, it is not very helpful in an analysis
of the economics of contemporary industrializing nations where the distinctions among
contracts are more a function of the economic role of the state than the duties imposed
on the individual contractors.
96. See Calabresi, supra note 83.
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ties and the most efficient method of producing the "most desired"
package of goods and services.
By contrast, the command contract is a tool of public policy, a device
which ensures that the goals of the plan are realized. The original
decision that A and B are to contract with one another is made by
some state planning agency which determines that an input or output
must be transferred from one economic unit to another. Similarly,
the state may modify command contracts: Since the agreement be-
tween A and B is merely a tool to attain overall plan objectives, a
change in economic conditions dictating new ways to achieve those
objectives justifies state modifications.
Similarly, while the parties to a command contract may invoke offi-
cial remedies in the event of a breach, they are not free to decline such
intervention if they find it not to be in their best interest. In a com-
mand system the state must be able to invoke sanctions for non-per-
formance even if the parties would prefer to forgive and forget.T
Finally, while in the market system courts look to a set of general
rules to resolve contractual disputes, in the pure command system the
dispute is viewed primarily in terms of its relationship to the plan.""
The correct resolution is that which will most effectively further the
plan. This method of resolving contractual disputes about command
contracts must be solved according to detailed knowledge about the
plan and the relationship between it and the disputed transactions;
accordingly the agency that resolves contractual disputes must have
access to-or be part of-the planning agency or ministry.
While all systems reflect a mix of command and market,"" the recent
expansion of market principles in one socialist nation demonstrates that
major changes in the structure of economic organization will lead to
97. Pfeffer, The Institution of Contracts in the Chinese People's Republic, Part 11,
THE CHINA QuARTERLY, supra note 88, at 130.
98. Pfeffer, Contracts in China Revisited, With a Focus on Agriculture, 1947-1963, THE
CHINA QUARTERLY 106, 114-17, Oct.-Dec. 1966.
99. Pure systems of command or market contracts probably do not exist. Obviously,
in centralized economies like China and the Soviet Union, the system more closely ap-
proximates the command model. State enterprises are obligated to enter into
closely approximates the common model. State enterprises are obligated to enter into
contracts which are frequently determined by plan instructions. Contract disputes are
resolved by "arbitration boards" which resolve conflicts in terms set by the plan. See
Loeber, supra note 88, at 131-34; Pfeffer, supra note 98, at 115-16. On the other hand,
Western capitalist economies employ market contracts as a rule. Economic relations be.
tween private firms are governed by a system of private rights adjudicated in courts,
not arbitration boards. But public policy considerations may enter into the decisions of
courts resolving contract disputes, and some transactions, like government contracts, or
arrangements in regulated industries may also approximate the plan contract system.
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shifts in the contract system,10 0 and that the ideal types of command and
market contract are thus useful in explaining historical phenomena.
The nation, Hungary, instituted a broad set of economic reforms de-
signed to reduce the amount of centralized planning and increase the
role of the market as an allocative device. Under the previous system
of central planning, Hungarian enterprises were under a legal obliga-
tion to enter into contracts specified by the plan. Under the reform,
the state enterprises are free to enter into any contract they find in
their economic interest. While the state arbitration board formerly
could order any contract modified, this power has now been sub-
stantially reduced. Perhaps most significantly, the entire structure of
contract enforcement has changed. Under the prior system, enforce-
ment was handled by the state arbitration board, a de facto arm of the
planning ministry. It resolved disputes not by applying general rules
of contract law, but rather by determining the best solution in light
of the overall plan. Under the new system, independent and autono-
mous economic courts will resolve contract disputes by applying a
general body of civil law. The dispute settlement agency will be freed
of its former dependence on the planning ministry and will be part
of the career judiciary. Reflecting the shift in the economic functions
of dispute settlement, the system is becoming "legalized," relying on
general rules articulated and enforced by autonomous legal entities.
Such reform, to the extent that it is realized, would reflect movement
from command toward market contract.
V. Law, Politics, and Development: Authoritarian Modernization
Just as legal structure will vary with the form of economic organi-
zation, so it will differ with the form of political system. Research
on law and development must be sensitive to the varieties of political
systems that emerge in the Third World and their characteristic effects
on the legal order. Once we abandon the core conception belief that
"modern law" encourages democracy, it becomes necessary to reassess
our theories of law and politics and construct a more sophisticated
perspective for further research.
Such a complete theory is beyond the scope of this essay: While a
full treatment would require an appraisal of the entire range of politi-
100. The following discussion is based on a study by Gyula Eorsi, member of the
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Eorsi, Law and Economic Reform in Hungary, in LAW
AND ECONOMIC REFORM IN SOCIALIST COUNTRIES (G. Eorsi & Harmathy eds. 1971), and on an
interview with Dr. Eorsi in New Haven on May 4, 1972.
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cal varieties from democratic pluralism to full totalitarianism, authori-
tarianism is.selected for present analysis as it is a theoretically distinct
form of political system pervasive in the Third World.101
A. Authoritarian Regimes
Authoritarian regimes like Franco's Spain, Vargas' Brazil, Nasser's
Egypt, and Salazar's Portugal' 02 are not covered by classical concepts
of democracy and totalitarianism. Authoritarianism is not merely an
arbitrary point in the continuum from democracy to totalitarianism;
rather, it is sui generis. 0 3 Unlike totalitarian systems, such regimes
permit some line between state and society; but unlike democracy,
they tolerate only a very limited degree of pluralism. In contrast to
democratic and totalitarian systems, both of which encourage and re-
quire high degrees of political participation, authoritarian systems
lack the articulated ideology and administrative capacity necessary to
mobilize a populace.
Authoritarian regimes seek control of the legal order. One develop-
ment that may facilitate such effort is the spread of instrumental legal
thought. The core conception supports efforts to make legal thought
more instrumental partly because it assumes that democracy and in-
creased instrumentalism go hand in hand.10 4 But under authoritarian
conditions, the spread of legal purposiveness may in fact strengthen,
not weaken, authoritarian tendencies.
B. The Problem of Legitimacy in Authoritarian Systems
Many of the political problems of modernization '" center on the
crisis of legitimacy which rapid social and economic change create.
Industrialization, urbanization, and rapid communication erode the
myths by which traditional authority is legitimated and unleash forces
101. See generally S. HuNnNGcrox, POLITICAL ORDER IN CIHANGING SOCIETIES (1969).
102. The classic discussion of this type of regime is Linz, An Authoritarian Regime:
Spain, in CLEAVAGES, IDEOLOGIES AND PARTY SysrfnsS 291 (E. Allardt and Y. Littunen eds.
1964) [hereinafter cited as Linz].
103. For Linz, authoritarian regimes are:
political systems with limited, not responsible, political pluralism: without
elaborate and guiding ideology (but with distinctive mentalities); without intensive
or extensive political mobilization (except at some points in their development); and
in which a leader (or occasionally a small group) exercise power within formally ill-
defined limits but actually quite predictable ones.
Linz, supra note 102, at 297.
104. See pp. 19-20 supra. Some have also felt that authoritarian politics can hamper
economic development by weakening the legal structures needed to provide a frame-
work for market relations and thus for economic growth. See Steiner, supra note 7. at
56; and pp. 43-45 infra.
105. See I). APr-R, THE PoLrrcs OF MODERNIZATION (1965), and S. Htmrtxro.N Po-
LrrIcAL ORDER IN CHANGING SocErmS (1968) for useful commentary on the politics of
modernization.
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which it cannot contain. 10 6 Modernizing nations in the Third World
are unable to employ a strategy available to nineteenth-century Euro-
pean states in offering the market as a justification for legal domina-
tion. 10 7 Unlike those older states, contemporary developing societies
confront existing models of mature, industrialized nations and are
painfully aware that they are "underdeveloped" or "backward." This
perception affects political life, creating expectations of instant eco-
nomic development. The private -sectors of such nations are typically
backward, disorganized, and inefficient, and governments simply can-
not leave economic development to the invisible hand of the private
market. As late modernizers, they are inevitably influenced by mod-
ern models of economic organization. Today, when laissez-faire has
been abandoned in the West, and developed command economies exist
in the Socialist bloc, contemporary developing nations almost inevi-
tably lean toward a degree of government economic involvement.
As a result, economy and polity must merge to some degree in
the contemporary "development state." The state is viewed as the main
instrument in overcoming "underdevelopment" and political strug-
gle focuses on reaching the hypothesized state of "development." The
developmental state must offer its own positive program of action as
one of its legitimating principles. It must convert vague yearnings for
change into a coherent set of aspirations for "development," and offer
itself as the best method of achieving them.108
At some point the developmental state must produce economic
progress or lose the support of the population. Consequently, it must
not only create a developmental "mentality," but must also assume re-
106. Urbanization and the rapid expansion of mass communications are profoundly
secularizing forces which erode traditional bases of legitimacy, and create demands for
new forms of government "output" which traditional ruling groups are not equipped
to provide. See Huntington, supra note 105, at 35. See also J. HABERMAs, TOWARD A
RATIONAL SociEry 94-96 (1970).
107. In the 19th century, European states may to some degree have been able to
profer the market system itself as a factor legitimating domination. As Weber indicated,
nascent market forces pre-existed and helped develop the European nation state, and a
"market ideology" emerged that claimed that free market relations will lead to a just
and equitable apportionment of social rewards. This market ideology-which eventually
led to the laissez-faire ideals which took shape in the 19th century-served to legitimate
the nation-state, which in turn helped create and then preserve the market system. Since,
it was argued, market relations fostered freedom and achieved social justice, and the
state nurtured and protected the market, then the state's actions, albeit coercive, led to
a free and just society. By thus explaining why state commands should be obeyed, the
political market ideology did not so much constrain the state as explain to men why
they should accept the constraints imposed by it. See Habermas, supra note 106, at 97.
108. In a recent speech, Brazilian President Garrastazu Medici argued that the state's
ability to foster "development" justified the extraordinary powers which the government
had granted itself. Jornal do Brasil, July 4, 1972, at 1, col. 1. These powers included
the right to close congress, deny political rights to public officials, and try political
prisoners in military courts. For a commentary on these powers, see Carl, Erosion of
Constitutional Rights of Political Offenders in Brazil, 12 VA. J. INT'L L. 157 (1972).
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sponsibility for major allocative and production decisions. At the same
time, it must encourage the social and cultural transformations essen-
tial for the creation of a rationalized industrial system which alone
can satisfy the demand for an increased standard of living. Yet in
Third World nations, where traditional cultural ideas and social
structures remain strong, such transformations may generate conflict
intense enough to threaten the very stability necessary for an industrial
economy.
This tension between social transformation and industrialization may
begin to explain the prevalence of authoritarianism in the Third
World, where nations typically lack the ideological and organizational
development necessary to sustain full totalitarianism, yet are too riven
by class, racial, and cultural cleavages to tolerate democratic pluralism.
Whatever the reasons for the emergence of authoritarianism, such
regimes typically reduce and limit political participation, fragment
opposition, and coopt powerful groups whenever possible. While they
may resort to violence, they normally attempt to discourage political
action by making it appear unnecessary. They stifle political mobiliza-
don by converting political issues into technical problems and then
asserting the regime's monopoly on technical skills. This tactic not
only defuses independent political activity, but also increases the
legitimacy of state action by cloaking it in the mystique of technology.
C. Purposive Legal Thought and the Legitimization
of Authoritarianism
Law is one form of technical discipline employed for legitimizing
purposes. Identifying anything as a legal problem denies to a signifi-
cant extent that it involves any political questions, since an issue is
generally termed "legal" if there is some pre-existing norm or standard
which will determine the controversy.109 Once political issues have
been "legalized" in this fashion, they can be resolved only by the spe-
cialized elite who know the existing rules and the techniques of their
application. 1 0
109. In his study of authoritarianism in Germany, Ralf Dahrendorf has noted that
legalism, through its search for authorities above the conflicts of parties, discourages
democratic forms. Observing that a misplaced faith in the "rule of law" was one of
the underpinnings of the authoritarian political system of imperial Germany. he con-
cludes that "the exaggerated faith in the rule of law as an institution beyond
all conflicts of interest betrays the same aversion to discord, and thus the same evasion
of the uncomfortable diversity of uncertainty, that is inherent in the German idea of
the state." R. DAHRENDORF, SociErY AND DEMOCRACY mN GERUMNANY 197 (1969). See also J.
SHKLAR, LEGALISt (1964).
110. Linz observes: "The persistence of the previous social order that goes with
limited pluralism and co-optation means that the leg l profession so important in demo-
cratic politics and even under traditional rulers, will play a much greater role in au-
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But this strategy of legalizing politics can be a two-edged sword:
If the legal specialists are hostile to the regime, or if existing law con-
tains rules or principles inconsistent with its goals, legalization will
merely produce a new set of conflicts. Thus, it is not enough for the
regime to legalize political issues; it must also politicize the legal sys-
tem by coopting the profession and neutralizing those aspects of the
legal tradition antagonistic to authoritarian ends.11 In this task instru-
mentalism plays a major role.
The core conception contends that lawyers trained as problem solv-
ers will be likely to ask searching questions about underlying social
maladies and thus to formulate solutions which will be more "devel-
opmental" and more responsive to popular desires. This may occur.
But under conditions of authoritarian modernization, increased legal
instrumentalism may also have precisely the opposite effect. Instru-
mentalism may dampen basic conflicts emerging between the authori-
tarian regime and the legal profession and thus help the regime to
legalize fundamental social and political issues.
There are a number of potential causes of conflict between legal
professions and authoritarian states. First, friction may result when
a regime suppresses aspects of the legislative process, such as a re-
sponsive legislature or interest group formation, which the legal pro-
fession may believe are vital. Second, the system of regulation needed
for economic growth may be incompatible with the profession's belief
in a system of universal rules.'1 2 Third, regulation often attempts to
create new institutions through laws of a utopian character which are
impossible to enforce, and which confuse and demoralize the legal
thoritarian regimes than in totalitarian systems. The same is true of civil servants. Their
presence may contribute to the strange combination of Rechtsstaat and arbitrary power,
of slow legalistic procedure and military command style, that characterizes sonic of these
regimes. This preoccupation with procedure ultimately becomes an important factor in
the constant expansion of a state of law, with an increase in predictability and opportuni-
ties for legal redress of grievances. At the same time it may prevent political problems
from being perceived as such, irreducible to administrative problems and not soluble by
legislation. Legal procedures are often seen particularly in the continental legal tradition,
as an adequate equivalent of more collective, political expressions of interest conflicts."
Linz, supra note 102, at 327.
111. Certain types of legal thought have long been recognized as especially conducive
to the maintenance of authoritarian rule and hostile to democratice pluralism. For ex-
ample, German lawyers in the 1920's and 1930's had a legalistic or ru e-bounded notion
of politics: Influenced by Hegelian notions of the state as an entity standing above the
individualist struggles of "civil society," they preferred tile authoritative invocation of
pre-existing rules to pluralistic, competitive conflict as methods of determining social
issues. Since they held this orientation, the German lawyers were tied to the status (uo--
to existing law and to whatever group, including the Nazi regime, which exercised power
in the name of the state. Moreover, the lawyers' conceptions of state and society led
them to be actively hostile to democratic rule, which challenged their notions of how
social life should be governed. This hostility led the German legal class to invoke "nat-
ural law" to restrict the actions of the more pluralistic government of the Weimar
Republic. R. DAHRENDORF, supra note 109, at 232-48.
112. See p. 31.
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profession. 113 Negative reactions of the judiciary and the profession
may range from overt hostility to feigned indifference,' 14 further
encouraging the government to by-pass the organized bench and bar
in achieving its regulatory goals and thus widening the breach be-
tween the regime and the profession.
But once the legal profession adopts a purposive view of law it is
far easier for the state to legitimize its system of regulations.' 13 Since
instrumentalism places a higher value on ends than on legal form or
tradition, it is less sensitive to deviations from the model of rules;
since it accepts the state as the source of goals, it is less critical of a
non-pluralist process of goal formulation. When combined with the
belief that all problems can be solved by the state's technocratic ap-
paratus, instrumentalism thus provides the regime with a justification
for the demobilization of professional associations and groups. More-
over, as lawyers find that they can define their role and reform their
professional activity only by accepting this technical view of social
problems, they will find themselves gradually coopted by the techno-
cratic apparatus of the developmental state. Thus, the spread of in-
strumentalism will erode professional autonomy and forge close links
between state structure and the profession. 1"0
Finally, the concept of law as a purposive instrument can aid the
authoritarian leader who supplants a more democratic regime in de-
feating challenges based on liberal ideals. The secular, instrumental
view of law destroys any sacred quality of the traditional legal re-
straints that might have been a part of a nation's constitutional law
or lore. Since "law" is an instrument to achieve specific goals articu-
lated by the government, any values or principles of an older legal
tradition inconsistent with the regime's purposes can easily be dis-
carded. 1
7
D. Towards a New Typology for the Comparative Study of Law
in the Politics of Development
As the foregoing demonstrates, the core conception's assumption
that instrumentalism has an "elective affinity" with liberal democracy
113. See Steiner, supra note 7, at 54-55.
114. For a vivid description of one such reaction by a Brazilian jurist, See M. SEAUMA
FAGUNDES, A LEGALIDADE DEMOCRATICA (1970).
115. To the extent that the legal profession can shift to purposive thought, it will
no longer sense a conflict between its skills and the regulatory output of the state.
The legal thinker who looks at law purely as a purposive instrument is satisfied with
exploring the policy goals set forth in positive legislation and determining the "effec-
tiveness" of concrete measures taken to reach these goals.
116. Unger, supra note 8, at sec. 3.8.
117. See note 68 supra.
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is facile. Nevertheless, instrumentalism and authoritarianism may exist
without each other. Obviously, in any comparative study of legal cul-
ture our own would rank very high in its commitment to an instru-
mental view of law. But one would hardly be correct in asserting that
we therefore have an authoritarian political system. Although the
transition to increased legal purposiveness is in some sense a universal
feature of modernization, it is not sufficient by itself to explain the
relationship between law and politics in every modernizing nation.
Thus, in constructing a useful typology for further study it is neces-
sary to identify the varying types of purposive legal thought. For ex-
ample, as the previous discussion suggests, there appears to be a dis-
tinction between pluralist and statist forms of legal instrumentalism.
While both accept the view that law is an instrument to achieve spe-
cific goals, they differ as to how those goals are determined. While
statist instrumentalism looks exclusively to the bureaucratic-adminis.
trative entities of the state, a pluralist concept would insist that policy
goals be determined by a more open, representative, and competitive
process. Though this is a somewhat crude distinction, such constant
refinement of our concepts will be necessary to develop a truly com-
parative social theory of law.118
VI. Brazil: A Case Study of Legal, Economic and Political
Development in the Third World
Theoretical analysis, conceptual refinement, and the construction
of ideal types are not ends in themselves. Rather, such efforts must
demonstrate that they enable the observer to order and comprehend
empirical and historical data. This section examines recent legal,
economic, and political trends in Brazil, and demonstrates the prob-
lems of modem law thought and the utility of the broader perspective
this essay advocates.
A. The Advantages of the "Brazilian Case"
Brazil, with a population of over one hundred million, is the largest
nation in Latin America and one of the most important countries
118. Of course, these ideas must be rendered more concrete and operational If they
are to orient comparative study. One criterion that might be employcd to distinguish
between the types of instrumentalism would be the extent to which that basic legal
doctrine incorporates notions of pluralistic process. Such notions as "institutional capacl.
ty," deference to legislative decisions, and similar ideas which mark American legal doc-
trine would, in this view, indicate that our sysfem approximates the pluralist model.
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in the Third World. It contains Latin America's most advanced indus-
try and its worst poverty. In recent years, it has experienced one of
the higher rates of economic growth in the world, and now aspires
to full industrialization. 110 Since in addition to this size and economic
progress, Brazil has a rich legal tradition and sizeable profession, 120
it is not surprising that it has been one of the primary targets of "law
and development" scholars and activists.12' Thus, the "Brazil Case"
allows us to examine emerging relationships among law, economy,
and policy-along with the "law and development" analysis of them.
First, however, some background. The studies to be examined, and
the events in Brazilian legal life they analyzed, occurred in the late
1960's and early 1970's, a period marked by four major phenomena:
increased and more efficient state economic direction, rapid growth,
increased authoritarianism, and tensions between the government and
legal profession.
22
The Brazilian polity prior to 1964 could be characterized as a semi-
pluralist, semi-authoritarian system. A liberal democratic constitution,
in force since the 1946 overthrow of the truly authoritarian Estado
Novo, allowed substantial political competition. There were strong
residues of the prior authoritarian pattern, but these were counter-
balanced by other, more democratic factors. For example, an inde-
pendent judiciary and liberal constitutional provisions offered guar-
antees for freedom of association and speech; a multi-party system and
direct popular elections led to substantial political mobilization.
This system collapsed in 1964 when, after a series of crises, the
armed forces seized power. 23 While promising to "restore democ-
racy," the military regime has since moved toward full authoritarian
119. On Brazilian socio-economic and political history in general, see W. B.An, IN-
DUSRIALiZATION AND EcoNo Ic DEVELOP..ENT IN BRAZIL (1965); THE Eco.No.Iv OF BRA-
zIL (H. Ellis ed. 1969); C. FURTADO, THE EcoNOMIc GROWrH OF BRAZIL (1958); N. LEFF.
ECONOMIC POLICY MAKING AND DEVELOP FNT IN BRAZIL 1947-1964 (1968); P. ScusarTrEn
INTEREST CONFLICT AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN BRAZIL (1971); R. SCHNEIDER, THE PoLrriCA.
SYSTEm OF BRAZIL: EMERGENCE OF A "MODERNIZING" AuTORtTARtAN REGIME, 1964-1970
(1971); T. SKImORE, POLITICS IN BRAZIL, 1930-1964 (1967); A. STEP.AN, THE MILITARY IN
POLITICS: CHANGING PATTERNS IN BRAZIL (1971); J. WIRTH, THE POLITICS OF ARAnLiAN DE-
VELOPmENT: 1930-1954 (1970).
120. See Steiner, supra note 7, at 44-46, 62-63.
121. The studies included Rosenn, supra note 7; Steiner, supra note 7; and Trubek,
supra note 7. In addition, a lengthy report on Brazilian legal education and its role in
development was prepared by Peter Hornbostel for the International Legal Center of
New York. P. Hornbostel, Legal Education in Brazil, Oct. 1971 (unpublished study for
the International Legal Center, 866 United Nations Plaza, N.Y., N.Y.).
122. See generally sources cited in note 120 supra.
123. Schmitter, supra note 20, sees the 1964 military takeover as a "restorationist"
movement. He argues that, since the 1930's of the Vargas Estado Novo, the basic political
structure of Brazil has been authoritarian. The liberalism and semi-competitive politics
introduced by the 1946 constitution partially constituted, in his view, a facade behind
which substantial elements of authoritarianism survived.
HeinOnline  -- 82 Yale L.J. 41 1972-1973
The Yale Law Journal
rule by purging the Brazilian polity of most of its democratic ele-
ments. Simultaneously, the regime has assumed more direct control
over economic activity. While professing to believe in the free mar-
ket, it has increased the economic role of the state and has subjected
the private sector to a pervasive system of regulatory law. From 1964
to 1970, over ten thousand new laws and decrees were passed, many
of major significance. 124 The codification of tax law, for example,
transformed a hodge-podge of revenue measures into a conscious in-
strument of economic development. Similarly, complete new systems
of housing finance, banking, and capital markets were enacted. Most
of these laws, drafted by planners and technocrats, were issued as ex-
ecutive decrees.
Initially, this "blitzkrieg" of regulatory law caused dismay in the
legal profession. Brazil's lawyers found themselves totally incapable
of dealing intellectually with the new bodies of regulatory law. Accus-
tomed to thinking of "law" as general rules applied through deductive
techniques, they could not grasp the inherent logic of the new legal
order which contained few general rules, was not highly systematized,
and could be applied only through unfamiliar logical forms.12
But while this regulatory blitzkrieg dismayed Brazil's lawyers, it
delighted the foreign law and development activists and researchers.
In the government's output, we saw the raw material for research,
a vast corpus of legal "stuff" designed to bring about "development."
In the legal profession's inability to deal with this new law, we saw
an outlet for our reformism. These impulses merged in two studies
which will provide the focus for the remainder of this analysis. One
(which I conducted) examined the role of law in the development of
the Brazilian capital market;12 6 the other attempted to determine
which changes would and should occur in Brazilian legal education
as a result of the economic transformations occurring in the nation.127
B. Law and Development Research in Brazil: The Basic Assumptions
In the design of these studies and the interpretation of our "data,"
we shared many of the core conception's assumptions about law and
society. We saw Brazil primarily as a market economy.' 28 The state's
124. The Law Will Rule, BRAZIL, 1969, at 144 (Center for Inter-American Relations,
1970).
125. Steiner, supra note 7, at 70-72.
126. Trubek, supra note 7. That article is a condensation of my contribution to the
Portuguese language study of the Brazilian capital market, D. TRUBEK, J. GouvzA V ItA,
AND P. SA, supra note 7, at 23-92.
127. Steiner, supra note 7.
128. Id. at 43.
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role in economic life was analogized to that of the Welfare State in
developed capitalist nations: The market was the primary source of
economic allocation; government intervention merely maintained and
protected market structures, while supplementing market decisions in
a limited sphere. 120 We assumed further that this market economy
required an autonomous legal system creating and guaranteeing pri-
vate rights, through the promulgation of general rules. We therefore
reasoned that market growth was impossible without the development
of such a legal system.' 30 We predicted the emergence of adequate sub-
stantive rules of contract and property law, an efficient and autono-
mous judicial system, and an independent and technically competent
legal profession able to advise economic actors on the significance of
substantive legal rules.' 31 To ensure that these rules would be certain
and calculable, we reasoned that the action of the state would have
to be constrained by the "rule of law."'1
32
While this concept of the "rule of law" was largely implicit, it was
extremely broad. Law was a commitment not only to orderly and
regular governmental procedure, but also to more specific processes
and values (for example, the dignity of the individual or fairness in
state action)' 33 The rule of law was assumed to involve a social phi-
losophy which accepted diversity and the maintenance of a normative
structure that harmonized or compromised conflict.
1 34
At the same time, we recognized that the market must be regulated
to guarantee that development priorities would be obeyed. It was thus
clear that Brazilian economic development would require an effective
system of regulation in addition to one of purely private rights. 3 5 This
would require the inculcation of instrumental legal skills.30 We saw
no potential conflict between an autonomous system of rules guaran-
teeing private rights and increased instrumentalism in legal thought.
Accordingly, it was assumed that a legal system combining both could
be institutionalized and that the resulting system would be simul-
taneously liberal, instrumental, and pluralist. We therefore worked
129. Id. at 43, 49.
130. Id. at 48; Trubek, supra note 7, at 54-56; D. TRUDtE, J. GouVE.A VII., & P. S.
supra note 7, at 55-59.
131. Steiner, supra note 7, at 48; Trubek, supra note 7, at 54-56; D. Tuntx, J. GouviL
V1EMA, & P. SA, supra note 7, at 55-59.
132. Steiner, supra note 7, at 48-49, 56.
133. Steiner, supra note 7, at 49, 55, 89. D. TRuoE, J. GouvrA AIum, AN,,D P. SA,
supra note 7, at 80.
134. Steiner, supra note 7, at 48-49; Trubek, supra note 7, at 53, 55.
135. Steiner, supra note 7, at 51-52; D. TRUBEK, J. GouvVA VJEmA, & P. &N, supra note
7, at 64-68; Trubek, supra note 7, at 10, 52-53.
136. Steiner, supra note 7, at 70-72, 86-87; Trubek, supra note 7, at 53.
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and argued for this form of legal development, selecting legal edu-
cational reform as our primary vehicle.
But legal development, defined in these broad and liberal terms,
seemed inherently in conflict with authoritarianism. We saw a di-
lemma emerging, with Brazil's political organization and economic
policy on a collision course and "law" the point of impact.
On the one hand, the nation had experienced rapid economic de-
velopment by adopting a private sector, market-oriented policy with
limited government regulation. Our premises about the necessary
relationship between market growth and law led us to assume that
this course would necessitate an autonomous legal system, enforcing
private rights through general rules. Since we believed that the Bra-
zilian legal system was, in these terms, quite "underdeveloped," we
reasoned that future market expansion would require the institution
of both private rights and regulatory systems. We assumed that in
time Brazilian planners would see this need to add "legal develop-
ment" to their list of priority sectors.
On the other hand, we recognized that the regime's commitment
to authoritarianism made it hostile to certain features of Brazilian
legal life which we felt were essential to the rule of law. Rather than
fostering legal development, the regime was systematically destroying
the legal order. The military had abandoned all but the barest pretext
of abiding by constitutional norms (or any other check on executive
discretion). It had abolished substantive protections of individual
rights, including freedom of speech and habeas corpus. It had packed
the Supreme Court and purged the lower levels of the judiciary. The
Congress had been closed; legislation was promulgated increasingly
by executive decree. Military courts had been given jurisdiction over
vaguely defined political crimes, and defense counsel who dared take
political cases were subjected to increasing harassment, imprisonment,
and torture.131
Given the premises from which we started, there was thus an in-
herent conflict between Brazil's model of authoritarian politics and
its commitment to market development. Eventually, one would have
to succumb to the other. Thus, we speculated that either rapid mar-
ket growth would strengthen the system of autonomous private rights
and thus help restore liberal pluralism,13 or continued authoritarian-
ism would defeat the attempt to develop a market by undermining
137. See Carl, note 108 supra.
138. Trubek, supra note 7, at 71; . TRUBF.K, J. GouvEA VIEIRA, & 1'. SA, sUpra
note 7, at 80.
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the essential framework which only a private rights system could cre-
ate. 39 If the former occurred, Brazil would have both economic de-
velopment and democracy; if, however, the latter came to pass, it
could have neither.
C. The Studies
1. Law, Planning and the Development of the Capital Market
The impact of these assumptions and "dilemmas" on thought and
action is apparent in several specific studies. The first-my own analy-
sis of the relationship between law and the development of the capital
market-included speculation about legal development and financial
growth which represented a detailed application of our assumptions
about law-market relationships. In this study of the military govern-
ment's ambitious capital markets development program, I set forth
two related ideas. First, having observed that Brazil's capital markets
had not grown as rapidly as its planners had expected, I speculated
that this might be attributed to legal underdevelopment.140 The plan-
ners had provided substantial incentives designed to foster the growth
of a new issues market, by encouraging savers to hold stock and de-
bentures in lieu of real estate investments, foreign currency, etc. When
these measures failed to elicit the desired behavior, I reasoned that
investor reluctance could be explained by the fact that the Brazilian
private rights system was underdeveloped. 141 I observed that rules
governing creditor and shareholder rights were imperfect, that courts
were neither accessible nor efficient, and that sanctions were ineffec-
tive. Moreover, investors were unaware of their rights, and the bar
was not organized to inform or defend them.1 42 Consequently, the
system failed to give potential stockholders and creditors sufficient
guarantees. In short, the system failed to supply predictability to the
economic actors. 143
Second, I suggested that if those legal barriers were bypassed and
market development began, this growth would in turn bring about
further legal development.14 4 Having observed that after some initial
disappointments the capital market program had adopted new forms
139. Steiner, supra note 7, at 56.
140. Trubek, supra note 7, at 52-56.
141. Id. at 55-56.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 10, 54-56.
144. Id. at 71.
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of incentives and had succeeded in evoking some desired investor be-
havior, I reasoned that as the markets boomed they would generate
pressure for improvement of the private rights system. The financial
sector would demand "modern" substantive codes, a more stable and
coherent body of laws, a reduction in government ad hoc decision-
making, judicial reform, rationality in legal thought, and a restructur-
ing of professional organization. Accordingly, I praised the new pro-
gram as a brilliant maneuver which circumvented legal underdevelop-
ment, initiated market growth, and left any remaining legal barriers
for a "mopping up" operation by inexorable market pressures.?40
These developments led me to predict that the hypothesized legal
development would follow closely on market growth.
140
Finally, I argued that this legal development-which to my mind
implied the full program of liberal, pluralist, instrumental legalism-
could be seen as one of the "external benefits" of a development
policy that emphasized the private capital market rather than govern-
ment coercion or inflation as techniques for mobilizing economic sur-
plus. 147 This analysis allowed me to associate the capital market pro-
gram with liberal political ideals and to suggest that this program
would strengthen liberal tendencies in Brazilian political life and thus
combat distasteful authoritarian trends.'
48
2. Reform in Legal Education
The study of legal education reform in Brazil paralleled and com-
plemented my research on the capital market. It hypothesized that
while the Brazilian private rights system was relatively developed in
a formal sense, it was functionally inefficient. Courts, codes, lawyers,
and regulatory agencies existed, indeed abounded; the problem, how-
ever, was that they were incapable of effectively performing their
tasks.' 4 Given the basic core conception assumptions, these ineffi-
ciencies jeopardized economic growth. The study examined trends
in legal education and concluded that a significant part of this legal
"underdevelopment" could be explained by flaws in the nation's
method of training its lawyers. °50 It then argued for major reforms
in legal education, including the inculcation of more instrumental
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Trubek, supra note 7, at 69-71; D. TRuBr.K, J. GOUVEA VIEI A, & P. SA, SUpra
note 7, at 80.
148. D. TRUBEK, J. GouvEA VIEIRA, 9: P. SA, supra note 7, at 80.
149. Steiner, supra note 7, at 51, 55, 56-62.
150. Id. at 62-72.
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modes of legal thought.151 It was thought that these reforms would
strengthen market institutions, and at the same time it was hoped that
they would preserve liberal values which were explicitly identified with
the "basic traditions of Brazilian law."1 2 This program for improve-
ment of legal education meshed with my concepts of the need for the
improvement of the private rights system: The newly trained lawyers
and judges would man the new institutions demanded by the growing
private market system. Both studies contained the hope that economic
planners would grasp the argument and lend active support for this
new system, thus, perhaps unwittingly, undermining their own politi-
cal system.i, 3
But for all their lofty ambitions, these hopes, assumptions, and
efforts were soon dashed. Contrary to our predictions (or more accu-
rately our hopes), market growth has not engendered an autonomous,
pluralist legal system. Market growth seems to have had little effect
on legal life; moreover, those legal changes which have occurred have
not hindered the government's efforts to dismantle the liberal aspects
of Brazil's legal order. The capital market has expanded vastly; yet,
while there has been significant improvement in the government's
regulatory capacity, there is little evidence that any substantial pres-
sure is being exerted by market operators for the development of full
private rights or an autonomous legal system. Nor is there any sign
that the lack of such development is impeding market growth.
Recent developments in legal education similarly mock our pre-
dictions. It is possible to detect a growing emphasis on instrumental
thought in Brazil. But there is some reason to believe that this has
taken the form of authoritarian instrumentalism, and has functioned
more to resolve previous tensions between the legal profession and the
state than to generate new ones. 4 Thus, in the final analysis, liberally
motivated efforts to assist educational reform may have actually aided
in the consolidation of the authoritarian regime.
151. Id. at 77-79.
152. Id. at 79.
153. This was another rarely articulated premise. This hope was perhaps more evi-
dent in an article on which we collaborated. Steiner and Trubck, Brazil-AII Power to
the Generals, 49 FOREIGN AFFAiRs 464 (1971).
154. Brazilian lawyers and law students are learning the ropes of "legal engineering"
and thus are making themselves more valuable to the government in the process of
statutory drafting and promulgation. They are cutting out for themselves at least that
part of the niche we envisioned them occupying in modern society. But these attitudes
may undermine commitment to the traditional values of legal formalism, deference to
procedural requisites or to a pluralist view of law making, that is, to those elements
of the "rule of law" which had made the legal profession unpopular with the state ap-
paratus but upon which we had placed our hopes for democratizing the modernization
program. See p. 39.
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D. Towards a New Perspective
In Brazil we see the tragic implications of reliance on the core con-
ception, and the darker side of law and development research. For, as
is often the case in planned social change, the very ideas that prompted
reform efforts became obstacles to the realization of the reformers'
goals. The concepts failed both as guides to action and as a structure
for scholarly investigation.
Where then do we go from here? Perhaps the first step would be a
reappraisal of the Brazilian experience. Any such attempt would have
to view as problematic many of the relationships the core conception
finds invariable. The following are some of the conclusions of such
a reappraisal.
First, the structure of economic organization in Brazil, while relying
on market forms, is much closer to the paradigm of command than ini-
tial studies suggested. The Brazilian regime is more concerned with
securing direct administrative control over economic activity than in
encouraging the type of autonomous market development we posited.
Even the capital market program, which envisioned a market form of
organization, is implemented within a highly regulated and controlled
environment in which state policy plays a central role.
Second, although many Brazilian economic decisions are in private
hands, this system has relatively little need for an autonomous legal
order guaranteeing private rights through general rules. The economic
functions posited for law in the market paradigm are not particularly
appropriate for the actual structure of Brazilian markets. This is cer-
tainly true in the financial arena. A private rights system and the rule
of law, assumed by Weber and classical political economists to be essen-
tial for market development, do guarantee a relative degree of predict-
ability where the actors lack economic power over each other and
where government decisions are economically neutral. But the emerg-
ing structure of the Brazilian financial market seems to be one in
which a very few powerful groups are actively supported by govern-
ment policy, and where the government, in turn, is just as dependent
on the success of these groups. In other words, state intervention in
the economy is not pure command, but favors certain economic actors
over others, so that predictability for the state and the powerful groups
is a consequence of their mutual dependence.
Recently, the government has encouraged consolidation in com-
mercial banking, and in a short time only a few large units may re-
main. Informal relations of mutual dependence with the government
guarantee that policies will be sufficiently "predictable" and substan-
Vol. 82: 1, 1972
HeinOnline  -- 82 Yale L.J. 48 1972-1973
Toward a Social Theory of Law
tively attractive to these units regardless of how incoherent they may
appear to the rest of the nation. In this context, real power over the
source of rule-making is more important than any formal, universal
quality of predictability. And where these groups exert substantial eco-
nomic power over other market actors, a private rights system is prob-
ably of secondary importance. In this structure, efforts to develop such
a system of rights may not have a central role in economic development
policy. Thus, an authoritarian regime which fears the political impli-
cations of market law may, at no cost, avoid "legal development" meas-
ures suggested by modem law thought.
Conversely, we should consider as problematic the relationship be-
tween such measures, even if taken, and liberal pluralist political
structures. While we originally associated one with the other, it is
certainly possible to imagine a form of legal system relating to the
market that has little or no pluralist implications. Substantial expan-
sion and improvement of the judiciary, and changes in legal organiza-
tion could provide an improved legal framework for the Brazilian
economy without affecting the political situation. Once we realize that
even a highly developed market legal structure need not be liberal
and pluralist, we leave open for empirical research the relationships
that the core conception assumes invariable. In such research, the
scholar will be forced to consider the full complexity of legal relation-
ships in development.
Much more careful research must be done on legal life in Brazil
and comparable Third World nations before the Brazilians or anyone
else can understand the true nature of the complex processes that are
at work there today.155 While no definite conclusions about Brazil
can be drawn from this impressionistic reappraisal of earlier studies,
one point is clear: To the extent that scholars in the developed world
can have any genuine understanding of legal life in Brazil and through-
out the Third World, they will attain it only through more careful
study, oriented by clear concepts, and an awareness of the preconcep-
tions and normative values affecting the researcher. Only by casting
off the ideological baggage of the core conception can they contribute
155. The situation in Brazil today is extremely complex. The goverrnent has made
some effort both to improve the private rights system and upgrade its regulatory capaci-
ty. There has been a tentative commitment to a new civil code, and to new corporation
laws. Yet the civil code has not been passed, perhaps partly because such a major,
quasi-constitutional event would serve as a dramatic reminder of the unrepresentative
quality of law-making in today's Brazil. The regime has moved to curb the inde-
pendence of the judiciary, and has limited severely the powers of the civilian courts in
political crimes. Yet it has not waged full scale war on the courts, and has obviously
felt the political importance of maintaining a commitment to the legal order.
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to a study of law and development which will be more than the facile
export of outworn ideas.
VII. Conclusion
Legal scholars thus must avoid two major failings of previous ef-
forts. They must keep their value preferences and intellectual pre-
conceptions from blinding them to the actual phenomena of legal life
in the Third World. At the same time, they must attempt to con-
struct more precise and universal conceptual categories conducive to
realistic generalizations.
Naturally, there is a profound tension between these two goals. We
have seen how universal propositions have obscured rather than clari-
fied empirical perception in the past, and we may justifiably fear that a
mere search for empirical details will lead to nothing more than the
accumulation of unrelated and unrelatable bits of data. Yet if we can
maintain this tension, we can make some progress toward a genuine
social theory of law.
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